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Information Article

Emergency Response Planning - for the Smaller and/or Simpler and/or 'less well resourced' Air Carrier / Aircraft Operator





RELEVANCE and INTRODUCTION:

Depending on appropriate (aviation related) law / legislation (international, national, regional, local / tribal etc.), regulation, industry / best practice etc. - most types of **commercial air transport** (CAT) operations are now * required to have an 'auditable' and fit for purpose '** Emergency Response Plan - ERP' in place

* ICAO's (International Civil Aviation Organisation) **Safety Management System** (SMS) has been a major driver for such ERP requirement

** Re **this** information article (the document you are reading now), we have specifically targeted the '**catastrophic air accident**' type situation **only** (i.e. **not** aircraft incidents; pandemic; natural disaster etc.)

In circumstances where ERP requirement may not yet exist / apply - appropriate air carriers / aircraft operators etc. (CAT or otherwise) should nevertheless still be able to conduct fit for purpose emergency response ops (e.g. as a matter of own best practice; for humanitarian purposes; to preserve brand / image / reputation etc.)

The latter can be achieved via use of an adequate and operational ERP (and everything that goes with it e.g. manpower and other required resources [including budget]; training and exercising etc.) - which is appropriate / specific (including scalability) to the type and scope of air operation(s) etc. actually being undertaken

The author / owner of **this** information article (i.e. the document you are reading right now) has **separately** (already / many years ago) provided a series of comprehensive **guideline / template** documents for ERP preparation and implementation (and much, much more) by the typical larger (e.g. 50 - 75 seats all the way up to the 500+ seat A380) scheduled, CAT **passenger** type airlines i.e. the '**BIG BOYS**' - as we refer to them herein

This information article offers similar guidance for the **smaller** and / or **simpler** and / or **less well-resourced** passenger air carrier (together with [plus] other, equivalent types of aircraft operation, as appropriate e.g. air ambulance; business aviation; surveillance ops etc.) - in producing and / or updating an ERP - targeted specifically at these types of operation

(See images on front page and next 5 pages for some idea of the types of aviation related operations at which the 'intent' of this information article is typically targeted)





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<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tG05KsUxWK8>





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BACKGROUND

This 'information article' has been produced to assist certain types of air carrier / aircraft operator to (reasonably) adequately & competently prepare for (plan, resource, train, exercise etc.) and respond to the consequences of a catastrophic aircraft accident type situation, involving one of their aircraft

As already mentioned, the author of this info article has already produced comprehensive **guidelines / templates** (*separate* documents from *this* info article) for preparing ERPs (related to the catastrophic aircraft type situation) re what we loosely term herein as the * **'big boys'**

* For the purposes of *this* info article only, the **'big boys'** typically comprise (*very* generally speaking) most of the world's airlines..... in the context of (**commercial air transport - CAT**) **scheduled, passenger** operations (domestic and / or international) operating aircraft with seating configurations **in excess of** around 50 to 75 (seats) - all the way up to around 550 seats

Charter and **lease** CAT **passenger** ops, provided that they broadly equate to scheduled passenger ops, as already described just above, are also covered by those same guidelines / templates - as are most other types of CAT air carrier which operate the ** **larger** types of (**non-passenger**) aircraft e.g. air cargo operators (imagine a situation where a very large cargo aircraft, carrying [very] dangerous air cargo, crashes into a high density population city centre!)

** The **term** 'large / larger aircraft' as used herein is not *necessarily* used in its pedantic (**regulatory**) context:

(Pedantically, much of the aviation world uses this **term** [in relation to regulation etc. of air operations] - when referring to aircraft with a maximum take-off weight [mass] of **5,700kg (12,500lbs) or more**

However, a passenger aircraft having an actual max take-off mass of e.g. around 5,700 kg will typically only be able to carry, at most, around 15 to 20 persons - i.e. hardly a 'large' aircraft..... **but one which is typically included in the type of operation that *this* info article (the one you are reading now) is intended to cover / assist - *specifically* from 'emergency response planning' viewpoints)**

Note: Many ('large' aircraft type) air carriers / aircraft operators ('big boys') engaged in CAT operations **require an ERP** under one regulation (and similar) or another - mainly related to some form of an associated '**safety management system - SMS**' requirement(s), typically as imposed by a parent state's (country's) civil aviation authority - which, in turn, is typically complying with associated, International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) requirements (standards, recommended practices etc.)

Whilst what is written just above also typically applies to most 'smaller' aircraft type air carriers / aircraft operators insofar as **CAT** operations are concerned - this cannot necessarily be said (at least to the same extent) for those which might carry passengers - but which **do not** necessarily operate on a CAT basis e.g. certain types of business / corporate aviation; e.g. mining and offshore personnel transfer; e.g. humanitarian assistance / air ambulance operations etc.

For the latter circumstances - planning, implementation, training, exercising, operation, maintenance and review etc. of an ERP is typically accomplished on a 'voluntary' basis. However, such ops are precisely what **this** information article is all about and intended to assist





What is contained herein is targeted at **any type of aircraft operation** (CAT or otherwise; with or without passengers etc.) for which an ERP is required or otherwise considered desirable and achievable - **BUT** in circumstances where such operations are **not** suited (typically due insufficient resources - such as manpower and / or budget and / or facilities etc.) to adequately use the **'big boy' guidelines / templates** referred to on the previous page

Consequently, this information article is primarily targeted at:

- The * smaller / simpler, CAT passenger air carriers (airlines) which have historically fallen under the umbrella titles of e.g. **'commuter / feeder / regional'** type airlines
- Other types of smaller, passenger air carriers (CAT or otherwise) which have historically fallen under the umbrella title of **'business / corporate / ad hoc / on-demand'** aviation
- Any other type of 'smaller' air carrier / aircraft operator (passenger or otherwise) which does not fit under the above two bullet points - but where **such carrier is desirous and reasonably capable** of implementing a 'fit for purpose' ERP for its type(s) of operation
- Any other air carrier / aircraft operator, **regardless of aircraft size / mass** and / or **seating capacity** and / or **type of operation** - in circumstances where such carrier is desirous of implementing a 'fit for purpose' ERP for its operation, **BUT** where the provision of the associated resources required (manpower, budget, facilities etc.) is problematic. Included here (**exceptionally** and as appropriate to actual circumstances prevailing) might be some air carriers, which we refer to herein as **'big boys'**

* Use of the term 'smaller' etc. here is deliberately vague. It is up to the air carrier itself to decide if it fits into the ethos of **this** information article (the one you are reading right now) for the purposes of emergency response planning..... **OR** (instead) should be using the (**separate**) **guideline / template** documentation targeted at the **'big boys'**..... **OR** (instead) does not require and desire an ERP at all. **Note that the latter is, generally speaking, NOT a recommended option**

Note - another major 'driver' behind air carriers requiring fit for purpose ERPs is the **'IOSA'** audit operated by the International Air Transport Association - IATA. Targeted initially (mandatory) at IATA members, many of the **'larger'** non-IATA air carriers now voluntarily undertake this audit also

In a **significant** move related to the latter and also to this info article, IATA introduced its **'ISSA'** audit in early 2015. See pages **93 - 94** to see why this is 'significant' from the ERP viewpoint, for the smaller / simpler air carrier (aircraft operator)





IMPORTANT

Air carriers / aircraft operators which obviously fall into the '**big boy**' category (and having at least some degree of 'minimum acceptable' resources to dedicate to ERP preparation and maintenance) should * **not** be using this information article. Rather, they should use the specifically produced and appropriate **guidelines / templates** instead (separate documents from this information article) as referred to on the last two pages

* However, there can be rare exceptions. The latter are discussed elsewhere in this info article

For further assistance (if required) in 'working out' which air carriers / aircraft operators are targeted in this information article - please see appendix **A** (starts page **91**)

You might also want to take a quick look at appendix **B** (starts page **114**) before reading further hereafter





DEFINITIONS of SELECTED TERMS - as used in *this* Info Article

Victim

For aircraft accident purposes, '**victim**' is a term used herein, referring collectively to **all** on board the accident aircraft (**air victims**) - together with any **other** persons **directly** involved as a result of the associated accident i.e. the latter referring specifically herein to '**ground victims**' – typically being those killed, injured and / or traumatised as a direct result of the accident aircraft hitting the ground or similar / equivalent event

Note that the term 'victim' does **NOT** refer to the dead alone nor is it a term which should be associated with others who might be termed herein as **indirectly** involved (no matter how closely) with the emergency e.g. family, relatives & friends (FR) of victims - where such FR had **NOT** been travelling on board the accident flight - nor are (can they be) classified as **ground** victims

Family, Relatives & Friends - FR

A collective, generic term meant to indicate loosely the categories of persons having some form of relationship or otherwise valid (personal) link with associated **victims** (including **ground** victims if appropriate) of an aircraft accident. The term typically includes (i.e. as 'related to' or as 'known to' said victims):

- The Next of Kin (i.e. the legal or 'otherwise' closest relative / equivalent person)
- Other family members, relatives and similar
- Friends
- Appropriate business / professional etc. colleagues and similar
- Meeters and Greeters (*of all categories*) waiting to meet air victims at the emergency flight's destination airport - and / or similar persons who have gathered at the departure airport(s) of the emergency flight - after it has departed and subsequently experienced a crisis
- Any other person(s) having a reasonably close or otherwise valid relationship with a victim

The term '**associated, non-involved FR**' as used anywhere in this information article, should (unless stated otherwise) always be interpreted as FR who are associated in some 'valid' way with **air victim(s)** - **BUT** who had **NOT** actually been on board the accident flight itself - and who also cannot be classified as **ground** victims. Of course, the latter (ground victims) can also have their own '**associated, non-involved FR**'

Next of Kin / Closest Relative / Equivalent Person

For the purposes of this information article, '**Next of Kin**' / '**Closest Relative**' / '**Equivalent Person**' / '**Emergency Contact**' etc. - typically refers to the closest 'related' person as associated (in some '**valid**' way) with a specific air accident victim and / or ground victim. Note that the words 'related' and 'valid' as used in the last sentence can and do have many different interpretations around the world - i.e. legal, quasi-legal, best practice, custom / culture / tradition, religious, informal etc.





This subject is, in general, both complex and suffers (especially in the context of a catastrophic aircraft accident and similar scenarios) from a distinct lack of clear, explanatory guidance material - mainly because there isn't (in reality) much 'clear' guidance to refer to

However, an attempt at an explanation *is* provided but, as it runs to more than 20 pages, is not included in this document (which you are now reading)

Interested readers will find further details of the above (in a *separate* 'information article') at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/information/>

When you get to the webpage at the end of the above link, scroll down until you find the 'information article' (click on it to open and read) entitled:

- **Information Article** - Major Air Accident - 'Next of Kin' / 'Closest Relative' / 'Emergency Contact Person'

DEFINITIONS of **OTHER** TERMS which might be USED IN **THIS** INFORMATION ARTICLE

Referring again to the 'big boys' guidelines / templates (mentioned near the top of page 8) - note that certain (standard) terminology (with defined meanings) has been used throughout all of our own published 'big boy' documentation. The purpose behind this is an attempt at **international standardisation** of aviation ERP related terminology

Where appropriate, elements of this 'standardised' terminology (**glossary**) are **also** used in **this** information article (i.e. the document you are reading right now). A few examples include 'Crisis Support Unit', 'Humanitarian Assistance Team' and 'Triage Operations'

Accordingly, it is strongly recommended that the serious user / reader cross refers (where necessary) to the associated glossary, where the meanings of such standard terminology are explained in detail. It is also strongly recommended that such terminology is used in all derivative emergency response plans created and / or updated in accordance with **this** information article

Interested readers will find this **glossary** at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/information/>

When you get to the webpage at the end of the above link, scroll down until you find the 'information article' (click on it to open and read) entitled:

- **Information Article** - 'Glossary of Terms' - **Aircraft Operator ERP**





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LAYOUT / FORMAT / RATIONALE

Before we start, it will be necessary for the 'interested' reader to be able to quickly, clearly and easily differentiate between this '*information article*' type document (which you are reading right now) and the (separate) '*guideline/template*' type documents used to guide production / update of 'airline emergency response plans' by the '*big boys*'

Accordingly, what you are reading right now shall hereinafter be identified by the acronym **SERP** - (**S**mall(er) / **s**impler etc. aircraft operator **E**mergency **R**esponse **P**lan)

The * context of the different acronym **ERP** (wherever it appears in **this SERP** - as it will do in many places) is typically with regard to what the '*big boys*' do - and will generally be included for cross-reference and / or contextual and / or information purposes **only**. Note, however, that much if not most of the **SERP** is loosely based on the **ERP** - as will become apparent as you read further

* **EXCEPTIONALLY**, '*big boy*' air carriers / aircraft operators unable to meet the requirements of the more rigorous and demanding '*big boy*' **ERP guidelines / templates**, (typically due lack of the requisite resources and, very particularly, manpower resources and / or 'money' [finance]) - might (exceptionally) wish to use the / this **SERP** (instead of the '*big boy*' equivalent **ERP**) to guide production of their own emergency response plans

The **ERP** splits its guidance into '*Parts*' and then (where required) '*Volumes*' - the latter being a sub-component of the former. For example, the **ERP Part 1** deals specifically and solely with the **catastrophic aircraft accident** type situation - and for clarity, ease of use and standardisation purposes - is broken down into 10 different '*Volumes*', each dealing with a specific aspect of **ERP Part 1** preparation and use - as depicted in the diagram shown on the next page

To provide some standardisation between the **ERP Part 1** and the **SERP**, the **latter** document also **ONLY** covers the catastrophic aircraft accident type situation - and is similarly split into 10 different divisions, dealing with the same subject matter areas as shown in the **ERP** diagram on the next page

The 10 **SERP** divisions are known herein as '*Sections*' (1 through 10) in order to differentiate them from the equivalent 10 '*Volumes*' of the **ERP** e.g. **SERP Section 5** covers 'GO Team' operations; **SERP Section 9** covers 'Crisis Communications'. See page 16 to view the **SERP 'sections'** diagrammatically

A reminder here that the (separate document) **ERP guidelines / templates** are typically produced for the larger air carrier (generally conducting scheduled, passenger operations over a large national and/or an international network) - and where such carrier has sufficient resources (budget, facilities, equipment, manpower etc.) to adequately deliver what the **ERP guidelines / templates** require

A fictional (but based on a typical [*real*] '*big boy*' airline) air carrier is used throughout the **ERP** to facilitate context - where required. This fictional airline (known by us as '**ABCX Airways**') is also occasionally referred to in **this SERP** - but where this **does** occur, should now be related (put into a context) to smaller / simpler carriers / operators (i.e. **not** in the context of the '*big boys*')

A reminder also that this **SERP** info article (the document you are now reading) is typically produced for air carriers / aircraft operators desirous of introducing / updating their own emergency response plans BUT..... typically in circumstances where the size and / or simplicity and / or type of carrier / operation etc. - does **NOT** easily (if at all) lend itself to use of the **ERP guidelines / templates**. Again, a major factor here is typically 'lack of resources' - particularly those which are manpower (and probably financial also) related

Note: In an attempt to avoid potential confusion we have used **orange font** above when mentioning significant wording related to the **SERP**. Likewise, a light, **blue font** is used for the **ERP**. Going forward in this document, this convention is now continued (i.e. from page 15 onwards):





➔ **ERP PART 1 - Catastrophic Aircraft Accident** (for the '*Big Boys*')


The **ERP** is split into **10** component '**volumes**':





➔ **SERP - Catastrophic Aircraft Accident** (for the '*Smaller / Simpler* Boys')

The **SERP** is split into **10** component '**sections**':





RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN the **SERP** and the **ERP**

The ten '**volumes**' comprising the **ERP** come in at around 1300 pages in total. Each volume may be regarded as a 'work of reference' in its own right, with regards to the subject matter area covered

For example, **ERP Part 1 / Volume 6** alone (at around 175 pages when including the cross-referenced [associated] GHA [Ground Handling Agent] document) provides just about everything that an emergency planner for a '**big boy**' air carrier / aircraft operator needs to consider and achieve - re emergency planning and response (catastrophic air accident) at any of that airline's on-line '*** stations**' (otherwise known as 'outstations' / 'out-ports' / 'destination airports' [regardless or not of whether the latter are primary destinations or alternate airports] etc.)'

***** If you don't know what an airline 'station' or 'alternate' is, see cross ref. to 'glossary of terms' - page 12

As **station** emergency response planning is by far the weakest, most vulnerable part of any air carrier / aircraft operator's emergency response plan (for a number of valid reasons not explored further here) - it deserves particular attention - hence why those 175 pages have been dedicated to it

In contrast (and almost inevitably), smaller / simpler air carriers / aircraft operators using the **SERP** to prepare their own emergency response plans - will **not** have the various, required resources to plan and respond according to what is required - e.g. as per the 175 page **ERP Part 1 / Volume 6 etc.** used by the 'big boys' (together with the other 9 'volumes' of a standard 'big boy' ERP)

Nevertheless, the **ERP Part 1 / Volume 6 etc.** serves as an excellent reference source for putting together the equivalent **Section 6** of the **SERP** - **and is the basis for how this information article** (the entire document you are reading now) **has been generally planned, written and produced**

To make this 100% clear, a particular **SERP 'Section'** is based upon its equivalent **ERP Part 1 'Volume'** - **BUT** typically documented and put together (e.g. adapted, simplified, downsized etc.) in such a way that it (the resulting **SERP**) is hopefully of direct, relevant and proportionate use to the smaller / simpler / less well-resourced air carrier / aircraft operator - that it has been produced for

That said and regardless of size, simplicity and resources of your aviation related organisation - **you might as well abandon the project of producing a SERP right now** if there is no likelihood of 'you' (+ other, appropriate staff [particularly 'management']) being able to dedicate the appropriate amount of time and effort to it - and to also ensuring the availability of at least minimum required resources for the project (which will always include manpower and 'money' - amongst others) - together with the associated (and ever ongoing) maintenance, review and testing (exercising) required





Some Considerations

SERP or ERP

Firstly, we now assume that you are currently looking at the correct reference document for your own * organisation's circumstances i.e. the (this) **SERP** guidance

* **IMPORTANT** - Wherever the word '**organisation**' is used in this information article, it typically refers (unless stated or contextually otherwise) to the air carrier / aircraft operator desiring to prepare and implement a **SERP** in accordance with what is written herein

If you are still not sure, look at the information provided in Appendix A (page 91) - and then decide. Remember, **this info article** (the one you are now reading) is all about the **SERP** - and thus relates (but not exclusively) to the smaller / simpler / less well-resourced air carrier / aircraft operator

It is acknowledged here that some (a very small number of) air carriers / aircraft operators might genuinely find themselves somewhere 'in the middle' and thus not be sure whether to be guided by the **ERP** or the **SERP**. Again, a look at appendix A might help. If not, the organisation will need to decide for itself. Such air carriers / aircraft operator runs the risk of 'shooting themselves in the foot [if not both feet!]' if they choose e.g. the **SERP** - in circumstances where the **ERP** would have been the more appropriate choice - and vice versa

Resources (1)

The **SERP** is all about emergency planning / response etc. - in circumstances where availability / acquisition of (some / all) of the associated, required resources (including 'people') might be / are problematic - for whatever reason. At its simplest such resources break down into (list is indicative only):

- **Manpower**
- **Money**
- **Facilities**
- **Equipment** (including ICT [computers etc.])
- **Time and effort**
- **Knowledge, Competence and Experience**

Many (but not all!) of the most successful 'big boy' passenger airlines in the world (from profit and reputation viewpoints) generally (but not always) have (or, more correctly, have developed over time) adequate ERP capabilities in all areas as per the above bullet point list

However, for the smaller / simpler air carrier / aircraft operator, it is likely that some / all items in that same list will be in 'short supply' (for whatever reason) and thus emergency planning and response considerations might have historically been minimal - or even possibly ignored

This latter situation is no longer an option / acceptable for many (if not all) - in large due to the appropriate ERP etc. requirements of ICAO's **Safety Management System** (SMS) and equivalent (associated) national / regional / local etc. **legislation, regulation, best practice** etc.





Regulators, auditors etc. typically recognised the problems that the latter organisations (as per last para above) faced when undertaking this 'emergency planning and response' requirement - and the subject / problem was initially accounted for (taken into consideration) accordingly. This is typically no longer the situation!

In summary, the emergency planning and response **capabilities** for the **large / larger**, commercial passenger airline ('**big boys**') are today somewhat different from those of e.g. the **small**, regional air transport operator. However, both will (should) be 'acceptable' in their own ways (if funded, prepared, trained, exercised, maintained, executed etc. - correctly, diligently and responsibly). Some other types of smaller / simpler aircraft operation will similarly require a fit for purpose ERP (mandatory) whilst others should have an ERP as a matter of best practice

Resources (2)

By default, most **SERP** users will need to be 'creative' in how they might maximise use of their own, **internal** resources in the 'emergency planning and response' context. Let's look at a few examples below, using the bullet point list from the previous page:

▪ **Manpower**

In order to ensure an adequate, continuous **manpower** capability during emergency response operations, it might be necessary (the list is not exhaustive):

- For certain staff (not typically having a significant emergency response role to play **on the ground**) - to be **cross-trained & exercised** in same accordingly e.g. line pilots and cabin crew; loadmasters; in-flight equipment operators / technicians etc.
- For **all** other, designated emergency response staff to be **cross-trained & exercised** in as many different types of emergency response duties, as possible / practicable
- For **all** '**senior**' **managers** (from the top manager down) **to participate** (be **trained, exercised** etc.) in all elements of the emergency response concept and application
- Subject to certain safeguards (e.g. adequate insurance cover; training & exercising; common-sense etc.) **staff family members** (typically aged 18+) and other appropriate persons (e.g. **staff retirees**) may be **voluntarily co-opted** for specifically designated emergency response duties
- To **undertake longer 'emergency response' duty shifts** than is desirable e.g. up to 15 hours (or more) per shift, instead of the more common 8 to 12 hours
- When taking rest, meal breaks etc. from emergency response duty shifts (and before the next duty shift), to **take same at / very near to** (e.g. within 5-10 minutes typical travelling time max) **the location where such shifts are to be carried out**
- Where just a **single person** is **solely** available for performing a significant role during 24H **SERP** operations, then such situation must be planned for and managed accordingly by the organisation. The time to do this is during **pre-planning**!
- To **cease** some / all '**normal**' ops for an appropriate period (assuming that some 'normal' operations are still running - concurrent with the emergency response operation) - thus freeing up staff for the emergency response operation etc.





Obviously, the time to brainstorm the above (and more), document, finance, equip and implement it; get the training and exercising done etc. - is **BEFORE** an accident etc. occurs

▪ **Money**

* From **financial** viewpoints, **internal** manpower requirements related to emergency planning and response ops can be controlled (to a greater or lesser extent) so as to be as minimal as possible - for example (list is not exhaustive):

- The organisation's 'emergency planning manager and deputy' should be selected from appropriate, **current** staff (e.g. from any of the safety manager; security manager; quality manager; operations manager etc.) and permanently assigned to such posts as a 'secondary' duty i.e. probably with zero or insignificant additional remuneration (i.e. the SERP 'commitment comes with the job')
- The organisation's 'humanitarian assistance manager & deputy' should be selected from appropriate, **current** staff (e.g. the cabin crew manager; HR manager; customer services manager etc.) and permanently assigned to such posts as a 'secondary' duty i.e. probably with zero or insignificant additional remuneration
- All ops control centre staff (or equivalent) should be able to handle **initial** command & control aspects of any emergency response operation (whilst **also** maintaining concurrent normal operations 'on the day' - circumstances requiring) - until such time as other, appropriate responders become available. In extremis, the ops control centre may be alone in this task for a considerable time. Appropriate training and exercising (initial and recurrent) shall be undertaken by all such staff
- The organisation's crisis management centre (CMC) manager and support team should be selected from the organisation's most appropriate (experience, background etc.) senior and middle level management staff. Appropriate training and exercising (initial and recurrent) shall be undertaken by all such staff
- All key CMC staff **must** be cross-trained and exercised **in each other's duties**
- The remainder of the organisation's emergency response team should undertake (normal job / role associated) emergency response training, exercising and actual response duties - as an integral part of (and as directly or indirectly related to) their 'normal duty' job descriptions
- Where feasible, **SERP cross-training** (i.e. across / beyond 'normal duty' job descriptions and competencies) should also be undertaken in order to increase emergency response flexibility
- All exercising and training shall ideally be delivered internally e.g. as conducted by the organisations 'emergency planning manager / deputy' etc. (saves money!)

* If the **key** persons assigned to the above roles are inexperienced in emergency response matters, they should attend an appropriate (**external**) course of training. Various organisations worldwide offer same. Costs can range from around USD \$1000-2000 per person for a 3 day course. Travel, accommodation etc. expenses are extra - as required. Furthermore, if the **key** persons referred to above are not already '**trainer**' qualified - taking of an appropriate 'train the trainer' course is also recommended





▪ **Facilities**

The term 'facilities' as used herein refers in general to 'a place (building, room etc.) for doing something' - the 'something' in this case being related directly to the emergency planning and response requirements of the organisation

Whatever is required to make said facility / facilities appropriately 'workable and habitable' must also be included / readily available and budgeted for e.g. utilities (power [electricity], water, gas etc.); furniture (desks, chairs, cupboards etc.); fixtures and fittings (whiteboards, wall mounted clipboards etc.); washrooms / toilets; security system (physical and 'electronic' - as required); sustenance (food and beverage provision); cleaning / rubbish removal etc.

Some of the larger, more profitable airlines ('big boys') have sufficient resources to have constructed their own 'bespoke, dedicated and state of art' 24H emergency response facilities

However, insofar as the **SERP** is concerned, it will almost certainly be necessary to co-opt and adapt / transform (at time of crisis; for exercise purposes etc.) the most suitable (and chosen), **existing** facility / facilities available (for the emergency response eventuality) - in accordance with the emergency response policy e.g. is it (or can it be quickly transformed to be) big enough / equipped adequately etc. so as to support what the policy requires?

Whilst the above 'co-option / adaptation / transformation' requires careful thought to ensure the result will be fit for purpose 'on the day' - * significant expenditure is **not** typically required

* An **exception** here is that serious consideration **MUST** be given to ensuring that a back-up power / electricity supply is available for the organisation's facility chosen for **command and control** type operations - with respect to an emergency response type operation

If such an 'uninterrupted power supply (**UPS**)' system is already available in / for the chosen facility - all well and good - and this is the most desirable option. If not, explore the cheaper options available e.g. take out a contract with an external and relatively nearby third party organisation (if there is one?) to deliver a portable and adequate (power output; AC and / or DC etc.) generator to the facility within an agreed and achievable (as per contract / service level agreement) timescale

On arrival the generator (as per last para above) is connected to an appropriate socket (e.g. typically located on an external wall of the chosen facility) and powered up - thus delivering an appropriate power supply to the facility. The contracted third party generally undertakes to keep the generator running (refuelling; serviced etc.) when it is deployed - again, e.g. - via an associated 'service level agreement - SLA'. However, the relatively expensive bit here might be rewiring (as required) the facility in order to take and distribute the external power supply. However, this is usually a **much** cheaper option than fitting a bespoke (purpose built) and permanent UPS into the facility

Note - a back-up facility (for the organisation) should be designated in case the primary facility (as per above) is not available for any reason. Where feasible, the back-up facility should be located at a sufficient distance from the primary facility so that it is also 'not made unavailable' by any / the same threat which might close down the primary facility e.g. complete power failure; fire; flood; criminal act etc. An appropriate and associated 'relocation' procedure should be produced, trained for and exercised





▪ **Equipment / ICT etc.**

Appropriate equipment is required and used to make a facility function in a desired way

An emergency response facility functions at base level in very much the same way as any other major facility - with much of the equipment being common - comprising in the main of ICT / Telecommunications type systems and devices (hardware) and (whilst not technically being 'equipment') the associated and necessary software / programmes / applications etc.

In general, most existing equipment (i.e. already located in a facility) can be used / adapted for emergency response purposes - providing that whatever tasks / work it was originally being used for can be postponed and / or transferred elsewhere (latter should not present difficulties in principle - as emergency response ops **MUST** take priority over all else)

Accordingly, significant expenditure should **not** be necessary to equip a fit for purpose emergency response centre. However, some degree of extra equipment might ideally be required (e.g. if not already in place) - and some examples are listed just below. (List is not exhaustive); (List assumes that **basic** ICT, telecoms etc. are **already** available at each workstation in the facility):

- One or more large, flat screen (smart) TVs capable of monitoring news etc. channels. Programme recording and replay capabilities would be advantageous
- 2 FAX machines (one for inbound faxes - the other for outbound) + a sufficient stock of associated consumables
- Hi-speed (combined) colour printer / scanner / photocopier / FAX (this latter FAX can count as one of the two FAX machines mentioned in the last bullet point above) + a sufficient stock of associated consumables
- An overhead projector and screen. The system should be 'data projection' capable and be interactive with other, appropriate devices - including the smart TV
- **LANDLINE** telephones (one per each facility workstation) are preferred to mobile / cell type telephones (in fact, they are **ESSENTIAL**). Provided that such landline telephones are available, they can be 'backed-up' by **mobile / smart phones** - as required / available
- If the facility utilises a **digital** landline 'telephone exchange' then a small number of serviceable **analogue** (landline) telephones **MUST** also be available
- A small number of satellite telephone (with true, world-wide capability)
- A small number of short range 'walkie-talkies' (radio transmitter / receiver)
- A small number of 'state of art' smartphones (if not already available as described further above)
- A 'teleconference' bridge type facility ('Skype / Zoom / Teams' etc. can substitute for the bridge if / as available)
- A completely independent, secure and high speed internet system (typically procured 'off the shelf') - over and above the 'company normal business' internet system already available to the organisation





- Appropriate plugs / sockets, extension cables, international plug adaptors, recharging leads, batteries etc. + all associated spares, consumables etc. - should be available (as appropriate) for all of the above

The above list and below notes should **not** be considered as being exhaustive

Notes:

- ❖ Laptops are preferred to desktop PCs (should it be necessary to evacuate the emergency response facility, you can take the laptop with you!)
- ❖ Whilst telephone communications in the facility should primarily be conducted via the **landline** telephones referred to above, all present should also have with them their own work and / or personal mobile / cell / smart phones (should it be necessary to evacuate the emergency response facility, you can take them with you!)
- ❖ Whilst in the emergency facility, all work / personal **mobile** etc. phones should be set to silent mode and checked reasonably regularly for emergency related messages. However, they should **not** be used as the **primary** method of CMC **telephonic** communication
- ❖ Specific (emergency response use only) * email addresses should be set up for each PC / laptop in the CMC i.e. those persons **operating from the CMC** will use these specific email addresses **instead** of their 'normal business' email accounts. However, the ability to additionally access the latter (normal business email) from the same CMC PC / laptop etc. must **also** be available. Don't forget to set up an appropriate 'out of office' notification and 'new contact / redirection' details on your **normal** business email account
- ❖ All possible ICT **applications** required to run / provide ERP related information and services to those manning the emergency response facility must be pre-loaded (and up to date) on all, associated PCs / laptops etc.
- ❖ All possible **soft copy documentation** required to operate the facility (e.g. checklists; contact info etc.) must be pre-loaded (and up to date) on all PCs / laptops
- ❖ All vital soft copy documentation **MUST** also be produced, maintained (and kept current) in **hard copy** format - which (the latter) must be very quickly & easily available, in sufficient quantities, such as to allow all those operating from the emergency facility to each have their own (hard) copies. Same principle applies to the organisation's **operations control centre** (which will initially be managing the crisis until the [separate] emergency response facility can take over) - and also to the remainder (if any) of the operator's emergency response organisation operating from outside of the emergency response centre (as applicable)

* e.g. 'crisisdirectorerp@abcxairways.com'; 'logmanagererp@abcxairways.com' - and so on

▪ **Time and Effort**

Without emergency response plan 'buy-in' by the 'workforce' (in concept and in practice) - it is not going to work anything like as well as it otherwise might (if at all). For smaller / simpler / less well-resourced organisations, **total** workforce buy-in (in terms of time and effort involved) is thus vital

Top and line management are responsible for ensuring that such buy-in is achieved. How the above is accomplished is beyond the scope of this info article. If addressed appropriately, achieving such buy-in requires negligible financial input





▪ **Knowledge and Competence**

Workforce (at all levels - including top manager[s]) time & effort (in an emergency response planning context) should be targeted at achieving and retaining the knowledge and competencies required for effectively and efficiently conducting emergency response operations. This means implementing and maintaining appropriate training (initial and recurrent) and exercise (periodic) programmes. The organisation's 'emergency planning manager' and deputy should 'manage' such programmes

Resources (3)

Smaller / simpler / less well-resourced organisations are typically unable to **internally** provide **all** of the resources required to **adequately** conduct **fit for purpose** emergency response operations

For essential resources which **MUST** be provided (for whatever reason) but which are beyond the capabilities of such organisations so to do, they (essential resources) can be 'procured / leased' externally - typically from specialist, third party (commercial) entities. Such essential resources typically relate to:

1. * Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) + Personal Effects (PEs) Recovery Operations + Repatriation and 'Management' (funerals, memorials etc.) of Human Remains
2. Humanitarian Assistance Team (HAT) Operations (often still known in many parts of the world as 'Family Assistance' / 'Special Assistance' / 'Care Team' Operations etc.)
3. Emergency (primarily via **telephone**) Call / Contact Centre Operations
4. Certain (limited) aspects of '**Crisis Communications**' Operations (dealing with the media, stakeholders etc.)
5. Aircraft Salvage / Recovery Operations

* Even the largest, best resourced airlines ('big boys') in the world do **not** have internal DVI and PEs capabilities. In fact, under international law (and many national / regional laws), such capabilities **must** be provided by a specific international, national and / or devolved government agency **only**

Unfortunately, many countries (typically but not exclusively 'less' and 'least' developed countries [as defined by the United Nations]) have no such capabilities whatsoever - and it is thus left to the accident airline (or, more correctly, its specialist [third party / external] contracted representative[s]) to 'pick up the pieces' (figuratively and possibly literally). In achieving this, it of course works closely together with (and under the authority of) the involved government(s) / authorities etc.

Interested readers will find further details of DVI / PEs ops (in a **separate** 'information article') at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/information/>

When you get there, scroll down until you find the 'information article' entitled:

- **Information Article - 'Disaster Victim Identification** (DVI & PEs)

Click on it to open and read





For items 1 to 4 listed on the previous page, it is believed that the following **commercial**, third party organisations are able to provide elements of same (to varying degrees) as follows:

- **AVIEM** (USA headquartered) - items 1 to 4
<https://www.aviem.com/>
- **Blake Emergency Services** (UK headquartered) - items 1 to 4
<https://www.blakeemergency.com/>
- **FEI** (USA headquartered) - items 2 and 3 and elements of item 1
<https://www.feinet.com/>
- **Kenyon International Emergency Services** (UK / USA headquartered) - items 1 to 4
<https://www.kenyoninternational.com/>

There are a very small number of other such commercial providers around the world - but those listed above tend to be the better known. Note that none of them provide their services 'ad hoc / on the day' i.e. a **pre**-accident / crisis agreement (retainer contract) is invariably required - and needs to be paid for! (**Actual services provided** need to be paid for too, of course. It is suggested that appropriate insurance is taken out to cover the associated risk)

Furthermore, a very small number of '**big boy**' **airlines** possibly 'sell' some of the above services to other airlines. In the main, they typically cover 'emergency call / contact centre' services only

Concerning item 5 listed on the *previous* page, there are quite a few organisations around the world which can be engaged for aircraft recovery / salvage operations - many being major airlines themselves. An appropriate internet search should enable the interested reader to find them. If money is not a problem and your type of operation is suitable, also see:

<https://www.iatp.com/>

'Parent' (or similar) **Air Carrier / Aircraft Operator**

Some of the (smaller / simpler etc. aircraft) passenger airlines around the world (particularly in the USA) are '**feeder**' air carriers which operate on behalf of / in conjunction with a much larger (big boy) airline (e.g. Comair and Delta respectively)

In such circumstances, it is highly likely that the '**big boy**' airline will (quite reasonably) 'require' the **feeder** airline to closely co-ordinate (if not base) its own **SERP** with (on) the **ERP** of the '**big boy**'

It is more likely than not (but far from certain) that the '**big boy**' airline will already have a reasonable quality **ERP** - and thus the feeder airline should, by association as described above, also (but not for certain) be able to produce a reasonable quality **SERP** - with assistance, if so required, from said '**big boy**'

If this **is** the situation, such feeder airline might **not** need to use **this** information article to assist in preparing / maintaining its **own** ERP?





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




SERP - Section 1

Policy & Executive Summary

(You are reminded that the **SERP** deals with the catastrophic aircraft accident situation **ONLY** i.e. it is not for 'aircraft incidents'; it is not an aviation related 'business continuity' plan; it is not an aviation related pandemic (public health) or natural disaster plan; it is not an aviation related security or safety plan etc.)



An ERP is like an iceberg i.e. most of which is 'hidden / unknown / not adequately accounted' for etc.

Firstly, take a reasonably good look now at (separate document) the ('big boy') equivalent '**Volume 1**' of the **ERP Part 1** - found at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/guideline-template/>

When you get to the webpage at the end of the above link, scroll down until you find the document entitled:

- **CRPM Part 1 (ERP) / Volume 1 - Policy & Executive Summary** (Bird's Eye View)

Open the document (click on it) to read it (you will need 'PDF Reader' for this)

What you are looking to produce in this **Section 1** of **your SERP** is something similar to what you find above for the **Volume 1** of the '**Big Boys**' ERP BUT being a much condensed / summarised version (a 'bird's eye view') of same and also presented diagrammatically - where / if at all possible





However big (number of pages) your finalised (**entire** 10 Sections) **SERP** might eventually be, aim at this / your **Section 1** being about 10% or less of that entire size

Completing this 'Section 1' is not "rocket science stuff". However, what needs to be done fairly well is to summarise written information and then present the result as a **Bird's-eye View** using as many appropriate / associated **diagrams** as possible (i.e. use a diagram instead of text where opportunities so permit)

Paradoxically, **Section 1** will probably be the **last thing** you need to produce for your **SERP** - as Sections 2 to 10 must be produced first (of course) in order for them to then be summarised in this Section 1!!!

The 'Phone / Call Home' Scheme

See the (separate document) **ERP / Volume 1** (page **100**) referred to on the previous page - and ensure that you establish something similar (at least in principle and scalability) to the 'phone home' scheme - for your own organisation

When done, describe the scheme somewhere near the front of **Section 1** of your **SERP**

That's all we need say for the SERP, Section 1.....so now, over to you!

SERP Section 2 (Command & Control Operations) comes next (starts page **30**)





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SERP - Section 2

Command, Control, Co-ordination & Communication Ops (C4)

(You are reminded that the **SERP** deals with the catastrophic aircraft accident situation **ONLY** i.e. it is not for 'aircraft incidents'; it is not an aviation related 'business continuity' plan; it is not an aviation related pandemic (public health) or natural disaster plan; it is not an aviation related security or safety plan etc.)



Image credit: NATO

Introduction

If (aviation related) emergency response planning as a whole is likened to a 'chicken' - then 'C4' ops comprises its 'head' (and thus the brain). No matter how good the rest of the chicken, without the head, it is going to go 'round and round' in circles!

As this document (the one you are reading now) is a **SERP** (in contrast to an **ERP**) it is ***** assumed herein that resources (finance, facilities, equipment and [most of all] manpower) are **not** plentiful. We proceed on this assumption

***** Where this assumption is wrong **in part**, please adjust the advice given in **this** Section 2 accordingly. If this assumption is incorrect as **a whole**, then you might be reading the wrong document (i.e. you might need to be using the [separate 'big boys' document] [ERP guideline / template](#) instead???)





To start with, let's take a look at how the 'big boys' might conduct their own C4 Ops. Please take a 'speed-read' of the equivalent (*separate* document) 'Volume 2' of the ERP Part 1 - you will find it at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/guideline-template/>

When you get to the above webpage, scroll down until you find the document entitled:

- CRPM Part 1 (ERP) / Volume 2 - Command and Control Operations

Open the document (click on it) to read it (you will need 'PDF Reader' for this)

(174 pages)

The reason for the above is to provide the reader with a basic 'feel' for how C4 ops are prepared, produced and managed from ERP ('big boys') viewpoints - thus making the same task in *this* equivalent SERP 'C4' - Section 2 somewhat easier, more effective and efficient - whilst also delivering better outcomes

* Unfortunately, there is no 'magic bullet' solution to avoid this 'reading the "big boys" ERP' task!

* Yes..... We clearly understand how busy most (if not all) of *you* (interested and relevant readers) will be at work (already doing at least 2 persons jobs - right?). And we also know that when most of you get off work, the last thing that you want to do is read 'stuff related to the job' - including about the ERP / SERP etc.

BUT - you *do* need to have at least a reasonable idea of how the 'big boys' 'do it', so as to successfully provide a workable, scaled down adaptation for your own 'smaller / simpler etc.' organisation

Last thing - you will typically only need to do what is required above (and similar as required elsewhere herein) **once!** Thereafter the task typically 'reduces' to one of maintenance, training and exercising

What Is Typically Required in this Section 2?

If you / your organisation are / is to be reasonably capable of conducting the effective, efficient and expedient C4 ops required (following a catastrophic aircraft accident etc.) it will be necessary to firstly have most, if not all of the following in place - (to a greater or lesser degree, depending on 'what your organisation does; how it does it; resources available etc.') - including being documented in an appropriate, associated plan (i.e. in *your own* SERP - Section 2 [when finished]):

- An adequate **C4 facility** (building / office / room etc.) + appropriate fixtures and fittings (other considerations include access, security, environmental [heating / cooling], electrical supply [primary and backup], washroom facilities, catering arrangements etc.). This facility is known in both the SERP and the ERP as a '**Crisis Management Centre - CMC**' ←
- CMC to be based in the **most appropriate location** available (e.g. typically at / v. near to organisation's HQ location)
- Availability of an adequate (in number; trained; exercised etc.) C4 **manpower team** (known herein as the '**CMC Team**') - capable (as required) of 24H operation (via an appropriate shift pattern) for up to 7 consecutive days (possibly more in extremis)





- Adequate (numbers; trained; exercised etc.) C4 **supporting teams** i.e. ‘**Crisis Support Units**’ (CSU - see ‘Section 7’ [page 70] of *this* document for more details)
- Adequate & required **equipment** - especially ICT & Telecommunications (fixed and mobile)
- Adequate & required **software** (applications; programmes etc.)
- Adequate & required C4 **documentation** - in both soft and hard copy formats (e.g. **SERP**; CMC checklists; crisis contacts directory; log sheets etc.)
- Adequate supply of **stationery & consumables** etc. - including ‘spares’

Note 1 - Here in Section 2 we are typically referring to C4 ops conducted at / from / very close to the organisation’s HQ location - and requiring a mix of both strategic and tactical C4, but typically **not** involving direct, ‘hands-on’ (operational) C4 i.e. the latter being conducted **at or near the accident site itself** etc. (The latter is accomplished by other, subordinate C4 teams, as described later in this information article)

Note 2 - Unless you have very recently read it, it might well be worth reviewing again now the information (relevant to C4 operations) provided on pages 8 to 25

Which C4 ‘**Model**’ might be ‘**Best**’ for your particular **Type of Organisation / Operation**?

Firstly, take a look at the (separate document) **ERP / Volume 2** (see link top of previous page) - pages 23 to 34 to get some idea of what the above title is referring to - and then continue reading here

For the majority of **SERP** users, the most appropriate C4 model will probably be an adapted / scaled-down version of the ‘**Model 2**’ - as described in **ERP / Vol 2**. However, Model ‘1A’ is also a possibility *if* (repeat.....*if*) manpower and facility resources are not too tight and / or small respectively. In this info article (the document you are reading right now), we will be using an adapted (scaled down) **Model 2**

Note that a ‘model 2’ additionally requires the establishment / operation of an adapted / scaled down ‘**Crisis Support Unit - CSU**’ system. For reference, the latter system is briefly described on page 36 of that same **ERP / Volume 2**

For more **detailed** information on ‘Crisis Support Units’ - follow the below link:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/information/>

When the webpage opens, scroll down until you find the information article entitled:

- **Information Article - Crisis Support Units (CSU) - Typical Roles, Responsibilities & Accountabilities**

Open the document (click on it) to read (you will need ‘PDF Reader’ for this)

See also the same **ERP / Volume 2** (link shown top of **previous** page) - starting page 38 - for a more comprehensive list of typical CMC facilities and equipment. You can mix and match from that list for **your own** **SERP** CMC requirements, adjusting as required, as per your own, available resources





The 'Model 2' C4 System

CMC Team

Referring now to the 'Model 2' C4 *diagrams* shown on pages 31 and 32 of (separate document) ERP / Volume 2 - let's see how they might possibly be adapted / scaled down for typical SERP use (based on the assumption that actual emergency response ops are taking place):

1. We need to select and retain an appropriate person to be in **overall** charge of the organisation's emergency response operation - known in both the SERP and the ERP as the 'Crisis Director - CD'. At 'times of major crisis', he / she will typically operate, on a 24 hour (via shifts - thus more than 1 CD is required) basis, from the CMC. 12 hour shifts should be planned for **BUT**, where manpower resources are tight, longer shifts will be required
2. Two or three 'Crisis Controllers - CC' 'run / operate' the CMC (per CMC shift) on behalf of the CD. One additionally undertakes the role of 'deputy CD'
3. The CMC 'Log Manager - LM' and 'Administrator' roles can be undertaken by the same (one) person - if so required. This person may need to be one of the Crisis Controllers (additional duty) in extremis (e.g. manpower shortage)

The above means that (per CMC shift) we typically have a team of only four or five persons maximum conducting direct C4 operations - which should be just about right for most organisations using the SERP. Note, however, that the SERP CMC team still needs to typically undertake the same *type* and *number* of emergency response duties as the equivalent CMC team would in the ERP - the latter typically having twice as many staff per CMC shift than the SERP team. *The implications of this* (less people available = more work required per person) **should be particularly noted / managed**

See pages 44 to 51 of ERP / Volume 2 for suggested roles and responsibilities of those listed above - and adapt accordingly for your own organisation's circumstances. (Remember, when looking at the ERP, that it is written for the 'big boys' - so for now, just ignore any job titles shown [in the ERP] which are not relevant to the SERP [if they *are* needed, we will cover them later])

Crisis Support Units - CSU

The CMC team is supported (again on a shift basis during actual emergency response ops) by CSU staff, conducting 'normal duty related' **emergency** response operations - typically operating from 'normal duty' places of work (i.e. **not** from the CMC)

In the context of the SERP it is likely that CSUs (e.g. Flight Ops; Aircraft Engineering; Finance; Security etc.) may be represented by just one or two persons maximum. For the single person CSU, he / she might be required to man the CSU post on a 24H basis - eating and sleeping in situ / very close by. This is one of the many 'hard facts of life' which need to be faced when smaller / simpler / less well-resourced air carriers / aircraft operators conduct 24H emergency response ops

Emergency Planning Manager - EPM (known in ERP as 'Crisis [Response] Planning Manager - CPM')

The EPM (and deputy [if there is one]) are responsible for all aspects of emergency response planning (including training and exercising) within the organisation. Their proposed duties during actual emergency response operations are described on page 36 of *this* information article





What is expected of those Manning and / or Directly Supporting the CMC?

Operations Control Centre / Equivalent (e.g. 'Flight Watch')

See ERP / Volume 2 pages 68 to 78

A study of the above (checklist) clearly indicates the importance of having a trained, exercised and current capability, whereby the organisation's ops control centre (OCC) / equivalent team can adequately deliver what is required of them in a catastrophic aircraft accident type situation. When considering the latter, relate it to the circumstances applicable to your own organisation and SERP - and adapt, downsize, ignore (where appropriate) etc. accordingly

Crisis Director - CD

See ERP / Volume 2 pages 44, 61, 62 and 65. You will then need to adapt and downscale the latter ERP provided info for use within your own organisation's SERP

Remember that your entire CMC team probably comprises just four or five persons (possibly less) per CMC shift - so everybody (including the CD) consequently needs to do considerably more work / longer hours in situ (than the equivalent ERP team would). 'You need to get your head around this' (more work for longer periods / shifts) as there is typically no other choice

Sufficient competent, trained (initial and recurrent) & exercised (ongoing) persons should comprise the CD manpower pool (we will look in more detail at specific CD duties later)

At all times when flight operations are in progress, a fully trained and current CD should **always** be on 'short notice call', in order to be capable of immediate activation for crisis related duties

IMPORTANT - see the below 'boxed' information taken directly from (separate) ERP / Volume 2

Until the Crisis Management Centre has been manned to the point (not necessarily 100% manned) where it is able to take on the crisis / emergency response C4 task - the airline's on duty **Operations Control Centre** (OCC) team - under the leadership of the Operations Duty Manager (ODM) on shift, shall be responsible for the overall management of the emergency response

Note: For smaller / simpler airlines etc., it is possible (likely?) that the OCC team on duty comprises just 1 person!

Why is the above important? Because, at certain times of the year (particularly the more important public / religious etc. holidays), many organisation personnel are not at work - but the organisation could still be conducting flight operations. For the latter situation, the organisation will accordingly also need to maintain on-duty 'operations control / flight-watch etc.' service / staff (amongst others) - in order to support such ops

In such circumstances, it is typically only the ops control / equivalent staff who can respond immediately (on behalf of the organisation) to a catastrophic aircraft accident type situation - and he / she / they need to keep on doing so until the (separate) CMC is manned sufficiently to be able to take over. One of the most important responsibilities here is 'alerting and activation' of other emergency responders within (and possibly external to e.g. emergency services) the organisation





Even at 'peak' public holiday times (e.g. 5 minutes before midnight on New Year's Eve [Western Calendar]), the best of the '**big boys**' (if operating) can typically get their CMCs up and running (and thus able to take over C4 of the emergency response from the ops control centre) within around 1 to 2 hours of being alerted to an accident situation

For a number of valid reasons (not expanded upon here) it is likely that smaller / simpler / less well-resourced aircraft operators **will require considerably longer** to get their CMCs manned to the degree required to take over from ops control or equivalent. Up to 6 hours - or even considerably longer - is quite feasible

Public holiday or not / working day or weekend / day or night.....it will **always** be the ops control centre / equivalent which **initially manages** the emergency response, whilst flight operations are in progress - i.e. until the CMC is in a position to take over. In 'ideal' conditions this is still likely to take at least 30 minutes - and this is the same for any airline, including the '**big boys**'. Accordingly, **all** appropriate ops control / equivalent personnel should (**must**) be fully trained and exercised in their associated emergency response duties

Crisis Controllers - CC

See [ERP / Volume 2](#) - pages 44 and 63 to 65

You will need to adapt and downscale the above [ERP](#) related information for use within your own organisation's [SERP](#)

Sufficient competent, trained (initial and recurrent) and exercised persons should comprise the CC team manpower pool (we will look in more detail at specific CC duties later). All CCs should undertake exactly the same type of training as taken by CDs e.g. both groups typically train together

Whilst flight operations are in progress, a fully trained and current CC should always be on 'short notice call', in order to be capable of immediate activation for crisis related duties

Log Manager / Administrator

The activated CMC should be supported on a 24H (via shifts) basis by a CMC Log Manager and a CMC Administrator. Sufficient competent, trained (initial and recurrent) and exercised persons shall comprise the associated manpower pools - so as to reasonably expect adequate availability for crisis response duties. Note that for the smaller / simpler etc. aircraft operator organisation, it is likely that the log manager and administrator roles will be combined. In circumstances where dedicated personnel are not available for the above duties - they shall be assumed / shared by the on duty Crisis Controller team

Crisis Support Units

You will find a cross-reference as to 'what CSUs do in general' on page 33 of [this](#) info article. CSUs are also discussed further (as they roles might apply to smaller / simpler / less well-resourced organisations) in [Section 7](#) of [this](#) info article

Emergency Planning Manager (EPM) and Deputy

The primary duty of the EPM during emergency response ops is to act as the emergency response 'expert and mentor' to the CMC and CSU teams i.e. he / she (EPM) working, eating etc. in the CMC - and also taking rest (as and when possible) on an immediate or near immediate 'on-call' basis





Where CMC manpower resources are short, the EPM can also (shall be trained, competent and exercised to) undertake **any** CMC duty, as required

The deputy EPM is expected to undertake similar duties - but in this case as an embedded part of any deployed '**GO Team**' (GO Team operations are discussed in **Section 5** of this info article). Where GO Team deployment is not required, the deputy acts in support of the EPM

Recruitment

Appropriate organisation personnel for the C4 related appointments documented above (other than the 'operations control centre - OCC' team) need to be selected, approved (on a secondary duty [unpaid] basis), trained (initial and recurrent) and exercised (ongoing). OCC personnel are to receive similar training and exercising as related to their specific ERP designated duties

IMPORTANT NOTE

All CDs, CCs and the EPM should be capable of undertaking **any** crisis related duty **within the CMC** - regardless of who might normally be assigned to same. Such duties include CD, CC, Log Manager, Administrator, Humanitarian Assistance Team Manager (see **Section 3** of this info article) and Crisis Communications Team Manager (see **Section 9** of this information article)

Other Required Reading

It is necessary to now fill in some C4 related knowledge gaps before proceeding further. Please take a look at (separate) **ERP / Volume 2** pages **41** to **42**; **47** to **50**; **52** to **56** and **57** to **60**. When considering this information, relate it to the circumstances applicable to your own organisation and its **SERP** - and adapt, downsize, ignore (where appropriate) etc. accordingly

In-depth Review of CMC Team Duties

See **ERP / Volume 2** pages **79** to **142**

When considering the above information, relate it to the circumstances applicable to your own organisation and its **SERP** - and adapt, downsize, ignore (where appropriate) etc. accordingly

Other Useful Information

See **ERP / Volume 2** appendices **A** to **F**

When considering the above information, relate it to the circumstances applicable to your own organisation and its **SERP** - and adapt, downsize, ignore (where appropriate) etc. accordingly

SERP Section 3 ('Humanitarian Assistance' Operations) comes next (starts page **38**)





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SERP - Section 3

Humanitarian Assistance Ops

(You are reminded that the **SERP** deals with the catastrophic aircraft accident situation **ONLY** i.e. it is not for 'aircraft incidents'; it is not an aviation related 'business continuity' plan; it is not an aviation related pandemic (public health) or natural disaster plan; it is not an aviation related security or safety plan etc.)



As this document (the one you are reading now) is a **SERP** (in contrast to an **ERP**) it is * assumed herein that resources (finance, facilities, equipment and [most of all] manpower) are **not** plentiful.
We proceed on that assumption

* Where this assumption is wrong **in part**, please adjust the advice given in this Section 3 accordingly. If the assumption is incorrect as **a whole**, then you might be reading the wrong document (e.g. you might need to be using the [separate 'big boys' document] **ERP guideline / template** instead)





You now need to have the usual 'speed-read' of (*separate* 'big boys' document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 3 - 'Humanitarian Assistance Operations'](#) (184 pages) you will find it at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/guideline-template/>

When you get to the above webpage, scroll down until you find the document entitled:

- [CRPM Part 1 \(ERP\) / Volume 3 - Humanitarian Assistance Operations](#)

Open the document (click on it) to read it (you will need 'PDF Reader' for this)

The reason for this 'rapid' read through is to provide you with a very basic 'feel' for how humanitarian assistance ops are realised / produced and managed from the [ERP](#) viewpoint - thus (hopefully) making the same task of producing this equivalent '[Humanitarian Assistance](#)' [SERP](#) section somewhat easier, more effective & efficient - whilst also delivering better outcomes

As usual, there is no 'magic bullet' solution to avoid this '[reading the "big boys" ERP](#)' task!

What Is Typically Required?



If your organisation is to be reasonably capable of conducting the effective, efficient and expedient [humanitarian assistance](#) operations required of it (following e.g. a catastrophic aircraft accident) - you will probably need to (firstly) have most if not all of the following (starts next page) in place (to a greater or lesser degree, depending on 'what your organisation does; how it does it; resources available etc.') - and as documented in an appropriate, associated plan (i.e. in your [SERP - Section 3](#)):





- An appropriate **Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Manager** and **deputy** - appointed from the organisation's own personnel resources (secondary duties - no additional remuneration)
- A 'fit for purpose' **Humanitarian Assistance Team (HAT)**
- Established **training** and **exercising** programmes in place re both of the above
- An appropriate **facility** from which to operate the HAT (as / if appropriate)
- Adequate & required **equipment** - especially ICT & Telecommunications (fixed & mobile)
- Adequate & required **software** (applications; programmes etc.)
- Adequate & required **documentation** - in **both** soft and hard copy formats (SERP; HAT checklists; crisis contacts directory; log sheets etc.)
- Adequate supply of **stationery & consumables** - including 'spares' for printers, FAX etc.

Note 1 - The HAT (in whole or in part) will possibly (almost certainly?) need to be **outsourced** from an appropriate, third party (commercial) vendor of such humanitarian assistance services (see list on page 25). Where this is so, the aircraft operator should periodically 'audit' the vendor's HAT capabilities

Note 2 - Subject to space availability (which might be problematic), it is desirable that the HA Manager operates from the aircraft operator's CMC

The **deputy** HA Manager (as available) will typically deploy as a component of the aircraft operator's 'GO Team' (if activated / as available) and will usually lead GO Team HA ops (*whether the latter be conducted by the organisation's own HAT and / or a HAT provided by an external, third party specialist provider of same. For the latter, the deputy HA Manager will typically delegate such leadership to the third party provider and thereafter operate in an oversight role at or near to the actual accident location*). GO Team operations are discussed further in Section 5 of **this** information article

Which HA / HAT 'Model' might be 'Best' for your Type of Organisation?

Firstly, take a more in-depth look now at the (separate document) **ERP / Volume 3** - pages 22 to 47 to get some idea of what the above title is referring to

The usual **options** are:

1. **'Do it yourself'** i.e. originate and operate your own HAT etc. - recruited (+ trained and exercised) from within your own resources. Many of the **'big boys'** do this as they have the required resources - particularly manpower, budget and (to a degree) expertise. Most use unpaid 'volunteers' (typically recruited internally) who are trained and exercised specifically for the HA / HAT role. The largest of such teams can be several thousand persons strong!

The larger (manpower-wise; budget wise etc.) **'smaller / simpler'** aircraft operators might also opt for this 'do it yourself' option - provided that they can find enough personnel, without impacting adversely on the manning of higher priority, concurrent emergency response ops (such as C4 and CSU duties) - and also on normal ops (as appropriate for the latter e.g. *if* the organisation is still conducting such operations despite the accident)

A very simple formula can be used to calculate the ideal size of your HAT i.e. take the densest seating capacity of the largest aircraft operated by your organisation - and double it:





For example, densest seating capacity = 30. Ideal HAT size = 60

The organisation then needs to decide if it can spare and train etc. 60 staff to form the HAT - considering all other appropriate factors as indicated just above (previous page). If it cannot do so, it should look instead at either of options 2 and 3 below

2. Do it yourself as far as is feasible - **and make up the shortfall** **by engaging the services of a commercial, 3rd party supplier of HA / HAT type services**

Let's take the same example as per option 1 (on the previous page), but now assume that the organisation itself can **only** spare enough of its own personnel to form a **20** strong HAT

Provided that the organisation's financial resources etc. are sufficient, a contract / agreement can be taken out with an appropriate 3rd party (external) supplier, to make up the shortfall of **40** HAT trained persons

* We have used the quantity '40' here as it makes the concept and maths simpler to understand. In reality, the 3rd party will probably provide considerably more than 40 persons as a matter of standard practice. This is typically included within the mandatory annual retainer fee mentioned below

The way such 3rd parties operate is to charge the organisation a moderate annual retainer fee (which should be well within the financial reach of most smaller / simpler organisations). In exchange, the 3rd party undertakes (at time of crisis) to provide specified HA / HAT services to the organisation upon request, within a specified timeframe and to a pre-agreed (all being contractual) level of service

When / if actual deployment of 3rd party HA / HAT resources is required / takes place, the 3rd party further charges the organisation a pre-agreed rate of money for **actual services** provided - **and also** requires reimbursement for all **actual expenses** incurred in so doing (both payments are over and above the annual retainer fee mentioned above). Such charges can be expensive - and should be covered by it (the organisation) taking out appropriate ****** insurance

****** As a general concept, it is sound 'best practice' to insure against appropriate risks materialising - as associated with emergency response plan activation **as a whole** (i.e. **not** just for the HA / HAT element). For the **'big boys'** - total costs of any such activation can run into tens of millions of US Dollars in extremis - and pro-rata for the smaller / simpler carriers / operators. So, associated insurance is typically a very good idea!

In this option **2**, an activated air carrier / aircraft operator HAT (i.e. the **20** strong team referred to further above) will typically be able to deploy (for HA duties) much more quickly than the contracted third party HAT provided from the external source. In such situation, the 3rd party HAT is usually absorbed (upon eventual arrival at / near to where it is required to operate) into the carrier's / operator's own HAT - under the **notional** leadership of the deputy HA Manager referred to on page **40**

However, as the 3rd party HAT will almost certainly be much more experienced than that of the carrier / operator's HAT - **de facto** management of the entire deployed HAT operation might (should?) typically be **delegated** to deployed 3rd party control (still overseen, however, by the airline's deputy HA Manager)





3. **Engage HAT services from a 3rd party commercial provider only**.....here you are choosing for the third party to provide 100% of your HA / HAT resources - other than the organisation's own HA Manager and deputy (whichever option you choose, these latter two **must** always be provided from within the organisation itself - manpower permitting)

The main reason for choosing this option will almost certainly be related to lack of the necessary **manpower** resources from within the organisation itself. The annual retainer fee should be just about the same as for option 2 - BUT the charges for **actual** services provided and **expenses incurred** (in the event of an actual deployment) will obviously increase in comparison

IMPORTANT

First point - where manpower is short, the organisation (aircraft operator) will be forced to use option 2 or option 3 above (not having a HA / HAT capability whatsoever is today unacceptable to the world in general - and to / with accident victims and their family, relatives and friends in particular)

Failure to provide a viable HA response when needed could put your organisation out of business - it's as simple as that!

Second point - even where option 3 (as per further above) is chosen, the organisation should still endeavour to retain a (its own) small HAT capability (over and above the manager and deputy positions). Taking the option 1 calculation example of 60 HAT required (see page 40) - the option 3 solution is to find them from an external source. However, if manpower resources **do** so permit, the organisation should additionally provide its own HAT contribution, even if this amounts to e.g. no more than around four to five persons

What is expected of a HAT?

Again, study of (separate document) **ERP / Volume 3** - pages 22 to 47 will provide a summary of the answer to this question for the 'big boys'. It is also worth reviewing the HA related definitions found in the (separate document) '**glossary**' referred to on page 12 of **this** information article i.e.

- (Uninjured Crew) Survivor Reception Centre (Airport Airside)
- (Uninjured Crew) Survivor Reception Centre (Airport Landside / Off-airport)
- Disaster Victim Identification
- Emergency Response Team
- Family (Humanitarian) Assistance Centre
- Family, Relatives & Friends Enquiry Card - FEC
- Family, Relatives & Friends Reception Centre - FRRC
- Humanitarian Assistance Team
- Humanitarian Manager
- Immediate Care Team





- Joint Family Support Operations Centre (typically for USA based ops - but also a good concept to adopt universally)
- Mortuary / Temporary Mortuary / Body Holding Area
- Passenger Manifest Verification Task
- Passenger Record Card - PRC
- Reconciliation / Reuniting Area (Airport)
- Reconciliation / Reuniting Area (Off-airport)
- (Uninjured Passenger) Survivor Reception Centre (Airport Airside)
- (Uninjured Passenger) Survivor Reception Centre (Airport Landside / Off-airport)
- Triage
- Those definitions found on pages [11](#) and [12](#) of [this](#) information article

When considering the above information, relate it to the circumstances applicable to your own organisation and its **SERP** - and adapt, downsize, ignore (where appropriate) etc. accordingly

Other Required Reading

It is necessary to now fill in some other humanitarian assistance related knowledge gaps before proceeding further

Please have a look again at (separate document) [ERP / Volume 3:](#)

- [Appendix A](#) - together with [Attachments](#)
- [Appendix B](#)
- [Appendix C](#)

Whilst probably not essential, it is desirable that you also take a look at [all of the other appendices](#) - when / if you get the time

When considering all of the above information, relate it to the circumstances applicable to your own organisation and **SERP** - and adapt, downsize, ignore (but only where appropriate) etc. accordingly

'Business / Corporate / Ad Hoc / On Demand' Aviation Type Organisations and Similar

Due to the specific nature of your operations, you will often face a particular problem (for which 'workarounds' must be found where feasible) related to the provision of humanitarian assistance type operations as described above i.e. as provided specifically by the aircraft operator etc. - and / or its third party representative(s)

The problem relates to the fact that 'you' will **NOT** generally know where you are going to operate to until a 'booking' for your services is made - and often such bookings are made at short and even very short notice (a matter of an hour or two only in some [not too uncommon] circumstances)

Accordingly (and unlike your scheduled / regular public transport type air carrier /aircraft operator counterparts) you will typically be unable to adequately **pre-plan** for the provision of your own humanitarian assistance (and other emergency related) services, at such destination airports





This situation most typically relates to not being able to adequately pre co-ordinate your own SERP with the 'airport emergency plan - AEP' of such destination airports, which is a very significant, **adverse factor** - the consequences of which (from an emergency response viewpoint) should not be underestimated

For the same reason, you might also be working with a * 'ground handling agent - GHA' you have never worked with before, and thus the opportunity (as with the AEP) of adequately pre co-ordinating your own SERP with **such agent** might be lost. Again, the adverse consequences of same should not be underestimated

* Possibly better known to some business aviation carriers / operators as a 'fixed based operator - FBO'

It is this handling agent that will **initially** need to respond (on your behalf) locally - to any emergency to one of your aircraft, at the associated airport in question

In such circumstances, perhaps the only viable solution is to **pre-request** the appropriate (destination airport) **ground handling agent's** assistance (in the event of the organisation's aircraft having a major accident at such airport) **at the same time** as the 'normal business' ground handling request is also sent (to such **agent**) by the aircraft operator. The main advantage here is that the **agent should** already be ** familiar with the AEP of the airport at which it operates

** This might be a risky assumption - but it is probably the best option that you can plan on

Shown on the **next page** is an example checklist which you can forward to the **agent / FBO** (as described in the last paragraph above). Note that such **agent / FBO** may (and is entitled to) make an extra charge for providing such potential service. (Reminder - **ABCX Airways** is a fictional aircraft operator / air carrier)

SERP Section 4 (Emergency [telephone] Call / Contact Centre Ops) comes next (starts page 47)





EXAMPLE CHECKLIST - **AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT - Ad Hoc Landing Airport** (i.e. no ABCX Airways staff or 'regular use' GHA available at / near to accident aircraft's arrival/destination/landing airport)

- This is a generic checklist designed for use if an ABCX Airways accident occurs at an **ad hoc** departure or arrival airport **OR** in case of **en-route diversion** to such an ad hoc airport
- **This checklist is to be completed** (actions done) **by the ABCX Airways appointed ad hoc Ground Handling Agent / Airline Representative** (if any) **at the ad hoc airport** - following an accident to an ABCX Airways aircraft at or in the vicinity of this airport
- ABCX Airways will typically provide this checklist to the ad hoc GHA / Airline Rep etc. **before** the ad hoc flight is scheduled to operate at the airport. For en-route diversions - ABCX Airways shall FAX and / or email this checklist (to the airport diverted to) as quickly as possible after accident occurrence
- ABCX Airways will support the ad hoc GHA / Airline Rep / whoever - by telephone and / or by sending representation to the airport as soon as possible / practicable following an accident
- This checklist is deliberately short and simple. The ad hoc GHA / Airline Rep / whoever is requested to add to / expand it at his / her discretion - to cover all other responses and actions required by accident circumstances and local requirements 'on the day' - which are not already covered below

	Actions Required	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ?
1.	Ensure that all appropriate emergency services are aware of and deploying to accident (<i>Insert appropriate contact details for emergency services here</i>)	
2.	Ensure that local rescue & initial medical attention for accident survivors is provided / arranged (<i>Insert appropriate contacts for who you will check this with here</i>)	
3.	Telephone ABCX Airways Operations Control Centre & and pass accident details available (<i>Insert appropriate contact details for ABCX Airways Ops Control here</i>)	
4.	Provide very regular telephone updates to ABCX Airways - re on-going local accident response	
5.	Send a suitable representative to accident site if possible - to represent both your organisation and also ABCX Airways. Rep to take with him / her - 1) Passenger List 2) Crew List 3) Dangerous Goods information (if any). Rep to also safeguard ABCX Airways property (including aircraft & cargo) and any property belonging to those persons travelling on-board the accident flight	
6.	Send a suitable representative to airport operator's emergency operations centre - to represent both your organisation and also ABCX Airways (<i>Insert appropriate contact & location details for airport emergency ops centre here</i>)	
7.	Provide / arrange for a private, secure & suitably equipped airport (or other appropriate) facility / area to be made available for uninjured crew & passengers coming in from accident site. Provide a representative at this area to assist in the welfare / humanitarian assistance of all present. Record details of uninjured and pass on to ABCX Airways (<i>Insert appropriate contact & location details for this area here</i>)	
8.	Ensure that on-going medical attention is being provided to injured (e.g. at hospital(s)) (<i>Insert appropriate hospital(s) contact & location details here</i>)	
9.	Identify and care for all meeters & greeters waiting for accident flight at arrival airport/wherever	
10.	Ensure that appropriate arrangements are made to look after the deceased	
11.	Collect & secure all flight & related documentation from accident flight - and make 2 copies	
12.	Direct all media (TV, Press etc.) queries to ABCX Airways	
13.	Arrange / provide suitable & secure accommodation (e.g. hotel), transport, welfare, humanitarian assistance etc. for uninjured survivors - once they are cleared to leave the airport facility documented at 7 above. Also assist with onward flights (and similar) where appropriate	
14.	Maintain full written record (log) of all actions taken, information obtained / provided etc.	
	End	





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SERP - Section 4

Emergency (Telephone) Call / Contact Centre Operations

(You are reminded that the **SERP** deals with the catastrophic aircraft accident situation **ONLY** i.e. it is not for 'aircraft incidents'; it is not an aviation related 'business continuity' plan; it is not an aviation related pandemic (public health) or natural disaster plan; it is not an aviation related security or safety plan etc.)



As this document (the one you are reading now) is a **SERP** (in contrast to an **ERP**) it is * assumed herein that resources (finance, facilities, equipment and [most of all] manpower) are **not** plentiful.

We now proceed on that assumption

* Where this assumption is wrong **in part**, please adjust the advice given in this Section 4 accordingly. If the assumption is incorrect as **a whole**, then you might be reading the wrong document (e.g. you might need to be using the [separate 'big boys' document] [ERP guideline / template](#) instead!)





You now need to please have the usual 'speed-read' of (separate 'big boys' document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 4 - 'Airline Emergency Call Centre Operations'](#) (91 pages) you will find it at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/guideline-template/>

When you get to the above webpage, scroll down until you find the document entitled:

- [CRPM Part 1 \(ERP\) / Volume 4 - Emergency Call Centre Operations](#)

Open the document (click on it) to read it (you will need 'PDF Reader' for this)

The reason for this 'rapid' read through is to provide you with a very basic 'feel' for how emergency call centre (ECC) operations are produced and managed from the [ERP](#) viewpoint - thus (hopefully) making the same task in this equivalent [SERP 'ECC' Section](#) somewhat easier, more effective & efficient - whilst also delivering better outcomes

As usual, there is no 'magic bullet' solution to avoid this '[reading the "big boys" ERP](#)' task!

The 'boxed' information shown on the [next](#) page is taken directly from page [3](#) of that same [ERP Part 1 / Volume 4](#)..... please read it carefully as similar will generally apply (in one way or another - to a greater or lesser degree) to [this Section 4](#) of the [smaller / simpler](#) carrier / operator's [SERP](#)

- Note that '[ABCX Airways](#)' is presumed here to be a '[big boy](#)' airline / air carrier (based on a [real](#) operator) - conducting international, scheduled passenger flights on a world-wide basis (short, medium and long-haul)
- '[WYZ Emergency Services](#)' (WES) is presumed to be a fictional, third party commercial provider of specialist ECC services to its customers (including airlines). WES is modelled on a [real](#) provider of such services





This Section 4 assumes that ABCX Airways is **unable** (for whatever reason) to provide an ECC facility from its own resources and has, therefore, turned to *fictitious* commercial, third party (specialist) service provider, 'WYZ Emergency Services - WES', to deliver what is required (In reality, many [if not most] airlines [including the 'big boys'] fit into this assumption)

In reality again, there are less than about 5 to 7 such third party **commercial** service providers in the world e.g. AVIEM; Blake Emergency Services; (Possibly) British Airways; Kenyon International Emergency Services; FEI; (Possibly) Emirates (airline)

If your airline uses such a commercial provider (probably from one of those listed above), you **must** account for that **specific** service provider's 'ECC system' by adapting this generic guideline / template (Section 4 of the document you are now reading) accordingly

If your airline uses a third party emergency call centre provider operated by (and as part of) any **alliance; code-share; charter; lease partner** (agreement) etc. - you **must** account for such 'ECC system' by adapting this generic guideline / template accordingly

If your airline uses a third party emergency call centre operated by the '**authorities**' e.g. a national / regional police ECC, local airport operator, national / local government authority ECC etc. - you **must** account for such 'ECC system' by adapting this generic guideline / template accordingly

IF your airline **DOES** in fact have (exceptionally) the resources and infrastructure to run its own emergency call centre itself / internally - you **must** account for your own 'airline ECC system' by adapting this generic guideline / template accordingly

If your airline does **NOT** have any ECC capability (from whatever source) - **it is suggested that the situation be rectified AS A MATTER of the HIGHEST PRIORITY**

What Is Typically Required?

If your organisation (smaller / simpler aircraft operator etc.) is to be reasonably capable of conducting the effective, efficient and expedient **ECC** operations required following a catastrophic aircraft accident - you will probably need to firstly have most if not all of the following in place (to a greater or lesser degree, depending on 'what your organisation does; how it does it; resources available etc.') - as documented in an appropriate plan (i.e. in your **SERP - Section 4**):

- **A contract for the provision of ECC type services** (with an appropriate third party, [specialist] commercial provider of same)

Note - For a number of reasons, the greater majority of '**big boy**' airlines are **unable** to undertake the ECC task themselves. Accordingly, many of them 'contract-out' the task to one of the specialist third parties mentioned on the previous page. On the other hand, many such airlines seem content to have no viable ECC capability whatsoever, **which is a completely unacceptable situation** of course





Based on precedent and extrapolation of previous statistics (as adjusted for use of modern ICT and telecommunications technology), a **full, 500 seat passenger airliner** (conducting long-haul, **international** operations and having its **own** ECC capability) experiencing a catastrophic aircraft accident, is expected to generate (very approximately) up to * **100,000** telephone calls to its ECC (from all over the world) in the first 24 hours following the accident

Using simple ratio maths and logic, a **regional / commuter / feeder airline with 50 (full) seats** might thus be expected to generate (very approximately) around **10,000** calls in 24 hours - and similarly, a **25 seater** around **5,000** calls. (Actually, such logic requires adjustment as such regional etc. flights will mostly be **domestic** - thus the anticipated number of telephone calls will almost certainly be lower than quoted above [e.g. they might come from just one or two countries - possibly a few more - but nothing like from 'all over the world' as would be the case for our 'big boy example' ABCX Airways]

How much lower is anyone's guess, but almost certainly the ECC requirement involved will still be way beyond the capabilities of such smaller / simpler operators to 'do it yourself')

* With the exception of the third party ECCs operated by **airlines** themselves (e.g. possibly British Airways, Emirates and perhaps a **very** few more) all of the other third party, **commercial** ECCs listed on the previous page are believed to typically have an average call **taking** capacity of around **30,000** calls per 24 hours - which means (if e.g. the customer airline is flying the larger passenger type aircraft [e.g. B747; B777; A380]) that a significant number of **inbound** calls might not be answered for a long time (based on the 100,000 mentioned further above)

The 'knock-on' effect of this will thus also adversely impact on associated '**outbound / return**' calls

The author of this info article (you are reading it now) believes e.g. that the Emirates (airline) ECC has (had?) a total call **taking** capacity of around 100,000 per 24 hours. However, it is also believed that Emirates does **not** provide anywhere near this full capacity to its third party ECC (airline) customers

All of this detail is typically provided here for information purposes only as, for smaller / simpler airlines, the matter is largely irrelevant. However, some care is needed here in circumstances where the smaller / simpler airline is a **feeder for a 'big boy' airline** - potentially resulting in **much** larger call volumes - than quoted further above for such feeder carriers / operators

For **business / corporate** and similar (limited aircraft seating capacity) carriers / operators, the situation is typically quite different - in that low passenger numbers are typically involved (say an average of 5 to 10). Furthermore, the associated personal details (including contact information for home, office, possibly 'next of kin' etc.) are usually known by the carrier / operator, as they will have typically been taken during the 'booking' of the flight. Accordingly, the equivalent of an ECC operation for business / corporate (and similar) carrier / operators should be much more straightforward and considerably less complex in terms of numbers of calls made to the carrier / operator - and management of same

Consequently, if the carrier / operator has sufficient manpower and communications resources (telephones) - and considers itself 'capable', it might wish to consider the 'do it yourself' ECC option. If this is done, **it is still strongly recommended** that such carriers / operators take out an appropriate ECC type contract with a third party, commercial supplier - as a 'back-up / just-in-case' measure





- **A competent, trained** (initial and recurrent) **and exercised** (ongoing) **person who will ‘oversee and liaise’ with the contracted third party ECC** provider on behalf of the carrier / operator - specifically during actual emergency response operations - but also on an administrative, day to day basis - as required

ALL Crisis Directors (CD), Crisis Controllers (CC) and the Emergency Planning Manager (EPM) and deputy should (via associated [competency based] training and exercising) be capable of undertaking emergency related ECC oversight and liaison duties. The EPM should additionally undertake the associated day to day administrative function

A generic ‘**big boys**’ checklist designed to assist the above team to adequately conduct ECC operations in conjunction with a third party service provider, will be found in (separate document) **ERP Part 1 / Volume 4** - pages **31** to **37**. Smaller / simpler aircraft operators should adapt this checklist to suit their own, specific circumstances

- **An associated facility** from which the ECC liaison operations role (during a real crisis) can take place. The facility should also be appropriately equipped etc. As a selected person from the CMC team (i.e. any of a competent, trained and exercised CD / CC / EPM) will be undertaking this role - the default facility to use will typically be the organisation’s Crisis Management Centre (CMC)
- **All of the associated paperwork / documentation** etc. required to undertake actual ECC ops in conjunction with the contracted third party ECC. If the latter (third party provider) is ‘fit for purpose’, it will provide the operator / carrier with much of this paperwork from its own sources e.g. checklists, forms, a contacts directory etc. In turn, the airline should provide any of its own, associated documentation (e.g. contacts directory) to the third party
- An appropriate and reliable method of **very rapidly alerting and activating the third party ECC** when required so to do. In the vast majority of circumstances, the organisation’s operations control centre (or equivalent e.g. flight watch) should be **pre-authorised** to conduct same. Associated training and exercising must be provided
- An appropriate and reliable method of **very rapidly and easily transferring telephone calls to the third-party ECC**. (e.g. calls which *should* go to the ECC - but which arrive at the air carrier / aircraft operator / similar organisation *instead* - for whatever reason)

Where the organisation (aircraft operator etc.) runs its own commercial contact centre(s) (reservations; customer services; frequent traveller services etc.) for **normal** business, a suitable solution should also be found for diverting / forwarding accident related calls coming in to said contact centres - to the contracted third party ECC. An ‘automatic’ solution is best (latter commercially available from telecomms providers)

Typical commercial call centre software (and / or the software of host telecomms service providers) is capable of easily and remotely being set up to ‘auto-divert’ such ‘crisis’ calls to any third party ECC





Until the third party ECC is ready to receive emergency related calls (typically within 30 minutes to one hour of being alerted - possibly quicker) - the organisation (aircraft operator etc.) should **not** be diverting / forwarding emergency related calls to same (i.e. to said third party)

Lastly, it will be necessary to remove all inappropriate holding music / messages at the organisation's (aircraft operator etc.) normal business contact centre(s) (i.e. more appropriate messages [related to accident circumstances] should replace the normal business messages)

- **A failsafe method of rapidly** (typically within 30 minutes or sooner of initiating action to obtain same) **acquiring the passenger list** (manifest) **and crew list** (General Declaration) **of the accident flight** - and immediately forwarding these lists to the contracted third party ECC (together with any other legal, regulatory, airport, emergency etc. organisations also requiring same). Such lists should also be provided ***IMMEDIATELY*** to all those undertaking fire-fighting, rescue and medical related operations at and / or near to the accident location
- **A failsafe method of rapidly** (typically within 2 hours or sooner of initiating the task) **'confirming / verifying / reconciling' the passenger and crew lists obtained**, as a result of the actions taken in the bullet point immediately above - and providing the results to the same parties (as also listed in that same bullet point)

For more detailed information on these 'passenger and crew list verification tasks' see (separate document) [ERP / Volume 4](#) - pages [43](#) to [54](#)

- **A failsafe method of rapidly updating the third party ECC of any other appropriate and relevant information** received by the accident airline / organisation - and vice versa
- **An appropriate method of identifying and liaising with any organisation(s) which legally** (or similar e.g. best practice) **has / have an 'interest' in the ECC operation** and the associated information obtained, how used etc. Where appropriate and permitted, the carrier / operator / organisation might assign this task to the third party ECC. It is for the latter to decide (at contract negotiation stage) if it is willing and capable of so doing

An example of same in UK relates to required liaison and information exchange with the UK Police (more specifically, with a specialised police unit [effectively an emergency call centre in its own right] known as a '**casualty bureau**') and also with the UK government's foreign office (which is also capable of running its own, small ECC equivalent)

Similar (to the UK above) applies e.g. in Ireland, the UAE and Oman

A typical USA example relates to liaison with the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) office of 'Transport Disaster Assistance' (TDA) and the US government's 'State Department' (deals with foreign affairs)





- **An appropriate method of identifying and liaising with *any other organisations which have a valid 'interest' in the ECC operation*** and the associated information obtained, how used etc. Typically this might relate to code-share, alliance and similar airline etc. partners

Where any of the latter (other organisations) are also capable of their own (independent) ECC operation and there is a good reason to undertake / activate same - the closest co-operation between any and all such ECCs thus operating **concurrently** is obviously **vital**. Same principle goes for any of the 'official' organisations (and similar / equivalents) referred to in the last bullet point shown on the previous page

In a worst case scenario, up to four (possibly more in extremis) different ECCs (of one kind or another) could be concurrently dealing with calls from the whole world - relating to a single, catastrophic aircraft accident type situation

This is a 'nightmare' scenario which, if unavoidable (and in some circumstances it will be unavoidable) must be pre-planned for with all concerned. This latter can be a very significant undertaking - even for the best (ERP-wise) of the '**big boys**'

- **Rapid and reliable access to translation services.** Generally speaking the carrier / operator / organisation can rely on the third party ECC to provide same on its behalf
- **Use of a 'toll-free' (no cost to caller) telephone number(s)** which can be used to call the ECC (being at a minimum from the country where **most** passengers on the accident flight have residence - but ideally from appropriate, additional countries also)

An alternative solution is a 'collect / reverse charges' call. Generally speaking the carrier / operator can rely on the third party ECC to deal with both options on its behalf

- **The above list is not exhaustive i.e. there will almost certainly be other matters to consider - an example of which is documented below** (starting at top of the next page):





Travel to (or as close as possible / practicable to) the Accident Location

Note 1 - this sub-section has **nothing** to do with deployment of the accident carrier / operator's '**GO Team**' to (or as close as possible / practicable to) the Accident Location

Note 2 - refer to the definitions of 'victim' and 'family, relatives & friends - FR' found on page [11](#)

Note 3 - Note that the term 'transport' as used in this sub-section refers to all appropriate forms i.e. via surface (all methods) and / or air transport

In a very small number of 'jurisdictions' around the world a **legal** (and / or **quasi-legal**) requirement exists for the accident 'airline' to transport (or otherwise arrange for such transportation) a relatively limited number of FR to (or as near as practicable / possible to) the location of the aircraft accident

Whilst there are a number of reasons for doing this - they are outside the scope of this sub-section

The same has also become '**best practice**' for many (but far from 'all') airlines, in circumstances where no legal / quasi-legal requirement exists

In a nutshell and as related to '**big boy**' airlines, operating wide-bodied aircraft on international, long-haul routes - this could feasibly mean transporting up to one to two thousand persons (possibly more) from just about anywhere on the planet - to (or as near as practicable / possible to) the accident location

Such a task is potentially beyond the means of many airlines to deliver and, for those that can, is a major headache type project which is best avoided if possible

Well.....it is possible, provided that an 'appropriate service provider' is engaged by the accident airline from a (commercial) third party. As an example, the latter services are typically included as part of the 'emergency call centre - ECC' package provided by most of the third party vendors already listed in the boxed info found on page [49](#)

Whilst the ECC contract annual fee (inclusive of said travel services) typically remains reasonable, the airline concerned must also pay for the cost of the 'actual' travel services and associated matters incurred - plus a 'mark-up' for / imposed by the third party

Such costs can obviously become **very** significant and should be allowed (pre-planned) for as part of the airline's ERP resource / budget requirements. (As already mentioned elsewhere, it would be wise to also insure **everything** associated with an activated airline ERP response - including actual and mark-up costs incurred by such engaged third parties)

Note - the 'expense' doesn't stop with the travel. The provision of board (lodging, food and beverage) and much more is also expected to be eventually paid for by the accident airline / aircraft operator





For the smaller / simpler carrier / operator conducting passenger operations, a similar principle to all of the above should be anticipated and planned for - albeit adapted and considerably downscaled accordingly

For example, a catastrophic accident relating to a full 50 seat regional / commuter / feeder passenger aircraft could easily result in a 'travel' requirement for several hundred FR. Even a 20 seater accident could give rise to around 100 travelling FR

As with the 'big boys' - it is recommended that the best solution might be to use an appropriate third party provider of the required services (and ensure that associated and adequate insurance cover is procured)

Whilst it might just be feasible for some business / corporate and equivalent carriers / operators to arrange such FR travel themselves on some occasions - they could well do without this headache in the midst of doing the 'one thousand and one' other things necessary during a major air accident response. So, the solution again is the third party (commercial) provider (and again, don't forget to also take out suitable insurance to cover all major ERP related risks - including 'FR Travel')

What is expected of an ECC? (Plus Further Reading)

Most of the expectations of an ECC have already been covered in the sub-section above entitled:

'What Is Typically Required?'

The remainder (there isn't much more - at least at the higher level) can be found in (separate document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 4](#). It might be advantageous to take a look at the latter again before moving on to [Section 5](#) of the [SERP](#)?

[SERP Section 5 \(GO Team Operations\) comes next](#) (starts page [57](#))





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SERP - Section 5

GO Team Operations

(You are reminded that the **SERP** deals with the catastrophic aircraft accident situation **ONLY** i.e. it is not for 'aircraft incidents'; it is not an aviation related 'business continuity' plan; it is not an aviation related pandemic (public health) or natural disaster plan; it is not an aviation related security or safety plan etc.)



As this document (the one you are reading now) is a **SERP** (in contrast to an **ERP**) it is ***** assumed herein that resources (finance, facilities, equipment and [most of all] manpower) are **not** plentiful.
We now proceed on that assumption

***** Where this assumption is wrong **in part**, please adjust the advice given in this Section 5 accordingly. If the assumption is incorrect as **a whole**, then you might be reading the wrong document (e.g. you might need to be using the [separate 'big boys' document] [ERP guideline / template](#) instead?)





You now need to please have the usual 'speed-read' of (separate 'big boys' document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 5 - 'GO Team Operations'](#) (75 pages) you will find it at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/guideline-template/>

When you get to the above webpage, scroll down until you find the document entitled:

- [CRPM Part 1 \(ERP\)](#) / [Volume 5 - GO Team Operations](#)

Open the document (click on it) to read it (you will need 'PDF Reader' for this)

The reason for this rapid read through is to provide a very basic 'feel' for how GO Team operations are produced and managed from the [ERP](#) viewpoint - thus (hopefully) making the same task in this equivalent [SERP 'GO Team' Section](#) somewhat easier, more effective & efficient - whilst also delivering better outcomes

As usual, there is no 'magic bullet' solution to avoid this 'reading the "big boys" ERP' task!

Note - before reading further below, the user / reader should understand (or at least accept) the **GO Team** 'concept' - as used in both the (separate document) 'big boys' [ERP](#) - and **also** in **THIS SERP**. Depending on the users' / readers' circumstances (or, more correctly, their parent organisations' circumstances) this 'concept' should be interpreted and adapted with an appropriate degree of flexibility

The GO Team concept assumes that both ✳ 'airline' HQ **and** the airline's **main / primary** operating airport are **co-located or geographically close to each other** - meaning that the major source of airline manpower (with the possible exception of some crew) is located (resides) at or relatively close to said airline HQ / primary operating airport. Consequently, this also means that manpower for the airline's GO Team is thus mainly drawn from this same general, location / area. Typical examples include British Airways (around / near to London Heathrow airport area); Emirates (around / near to Dubai airport area); Cathay Pacific (around / near to Hong Kong [Chep Lap Kok] airport area); Singapore Airlines (around / near to Changi airport area) etc.

✳ The term 'airline' has been used above for the purposes of simplicity. Non-airline type air carriers / aircraft operators (e.g. Cargo) required to form a GO Team should interpret & adapt same accordingly

The concept of a GO Team as used in the [ERP and SERP](#) is that it **only** deploys in support of a major aircraft accident response - typically (but not always - think 'codeshare' and 'alliance' partners) involving one of its own aircraft - where the accident location is **NOT at** or **very close** to airline HQ / main operating airport.

Accordingly, 'transport' will thus **always** be required for such GO Team deployment s- and in many (but not all) cases, will be by air

In contrast, the **concept** documented just above is **NOT** used for an aircraft accident etc. occurring **at or very near to** airline HQ / main operating airport. Of course, the emergency response will still be dealt with by the airline and its manpower + other (external) resources deployed **locally** as required - **BUT** - the concept of such manpower needing to 'travel' to the accident location (other than **very** short distances) is now **not** applicable





What does this (all of the above) mean in reality?

It means that **unless** an aircraft accident occurs at or very close to airline HQ / main operating airport location - GO Team deployment (in its formal sense) will **ALWAYS** be required - and thus GO Team deployable staff can reliably commence making associated preparations without doubt or hesitation (e.g. packing a suitcase; telling the spouse / family / boss; collecting appropriate travel documentation [passport; vaccination certificates and so on]; money / finances etc.) - thus also avoiding consequential delay in getting the GO Team on its way

Adopting this concept contributes to many (but not all) 'big boy' airlines being able to get their GO Teams 'on their way' within **3 hours or less** of *initial accident notification to the airline* involved

What Is Typically Required?

If your organisation is to be reasonably capable of conducting the effective, efficient and expedient GO Team operations required following a catastrophic aircraft accident - you will probably need to firstly have most if not all of the following in place / capable of being rapidly arranged - (to a greater or lesser degree, depending on 'what your organisation does; how it does it; resources available etc.') - and documented in an appropriate plan (i.e. in this, your **SERP Section 5**). Unless stated otherwise, the assumption is made that the GO Team will deploy by air (this will not always be so):

1. The GO Team Itself

Note - an airline's own deployed Humanitarian Assistance Team (HAT) is considered (in both the **ERP** and the **SERP**) to be a **component part** only of the overarching, deployed GO Team. In many cases the HAT will, by far, comprise the largest component part of such GO Team. **However, it is important to clearly understand that the HAT alone is NOT the GO Team as a whole**

For what typically comprises a deployed GO Team - together with some of the associated considerations involved, see (separate 'big boy' document) **ERP Part 1 / Volume 5** - pages **21** to **35**; **40** to **46** and **47** to **49**

Individual GO Team members should ensure that they are currently **competent** (trained **and** exercised etc.) to do what is required of them (circumstances 'on the day' so permitting) with regards to GO Team activation, deployment and associated operations / response

A self-contained 'mini' glossary of the more commonly used GO Team terminology used herein can be found in appendix **E** (page **68**) of (separate document) **ERP Part 1 / Volume 5**

2. Other Supporting Resources Necessary - including budget; the airline's own deployable (supporting) equipment (the latter commonly known as a 'GO Kit') etc.

Separate from the GO Kit, certain deploying GO Team elements might also take their own, specialist equipment with them e.g. the organisation's ICT (Information Communications & Technology) and Medical (or equivalent) departments / business units. Likewise for the organisation's own 'air accident investigation team' - if so 'invited' by the appropriate (formal) 'investigation authority'

Further details of a typical 'GO Kit' for larger aircraft operators can be found in **ERP Part 1 / Volume 5** - starting on page **28** and in appendix **D** (page **66**)






3. **A suitable modification to the organisation's emergency response 'alerting and activation' system / procedure - specifically for the GO Team.** For further explanation of why and how this might be accomplished, see (separate document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 5](#) - pages [25](#) to [27](#)


4. **An appropriate procedure for finding a suitable aircraft and crew for deploying the GO Team - assuming that same will (first choice) be found from the organisation's own fleet / resources**


Note - where an appropriate aircraft (size, range etc.) is **not** available from **own** (airline) resources - consider air charter options (this will be expensive [again, it is recommended that ERP related insurance is taken out to cover this and other, expected eventualities which 'need to be paid for']). In extremis, it might be necessary to deploy a GO Team via 'normal' commercial air transport methods (this will typically cause significant inconvenience and delay in getting the GO Team to where it is needed)


Where necessary and appropriate, GO Team deployment might need to be via one and / or other form of ground / surface transport - either separate from or combined with air transport e.g. if deploying to the Maldives (in circumstances where the only airport available there has been closed by the air accident - and is likely to remain closed for some time) - then an (one of several) option might be to fly the GO Team to Colombo (in Sri Lanka) and then transport them onwards by sea transport (including use of 'float planes').

Note that it is the **principle** that is important here (re the para just above) to smaller / simpler air carriers etc. - not the circumstances of the example itself (which are more applicable to 'big boy' airlines)

5. **An appropriate procedure for checking-in the GO Team and loading the GO Kit at the pre-nominated departure airport(s)** e.g. the overriding requirement to typically get the GO Team on its way as quickly as possible means that check-in should be generally accomplished  without tickets (known in the airline industry as a 'Go / Show' or 'NOREC' procedure)

 On check-in (in such circumstances) a notional' ticket will be created in the appropriate reservations and / or check-in system used. This ensures that the GO Team 'passenger' is covered by the associated conditions of carriage - including insurance, compensation etc. - as appropriate

6.  **The capability to competently and quickly flight plan and obtain appropriate permissions and other arrangements for the GO Team flight** e.g. ad hoc 'overflight clearances', airport departure and arrival slots, in-transit (tech stop) ground handling etc.

 Use the appropriate (international law [ICAO]) requirements of ICAO Annex 9, Chapter 8 to facilitate granting of such permissions where required. For more information on this matter see (separate document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 5 - appendix C - page 64](#). (Don't forget to insert the term '**STS/HUM**' in item 18 of all ATS [Air Traffic Services] flight plans filed)

7. Where possible and appropriate, **pre-arrange** (e.g. whilst the GO Team is en route) for the necessary **arrival handling, facilities, facilitator(s) etc. - to be provided at the GO Team final destination airport**. Use the appropriate provisions of **ICAO Annex 9, Chapter 8** to assist in this task, where necessary





What is expected of a GO Team? (Plus Further Reading)

The more significant expectations required of a 'fit for purpose' GO Team have already been covered (and / or cross-referred to in the 'separate document' [ERP Part 1 / Volume 5](#)) - in the sub-section above (starts page [59](#)) entitled '[What Is Typically Required?](#)'

The remainder (there isn't much more) can be found again in (separate document) [ERP Part 1 / Vol 5](#) - starting with page [36](#) - which provides an example 'worst case' GO Team deployment scenario. Smaller / simpler carriers / operators should 'interpret, adapt and revise' the above scenario to suit their own types of operation and circumstances - and then include in their own [SERP Section 5](#)

It is also necessary to use such scenario, of course, as part of the whole GO Team planning process 'from the ground up'. Remember, the scenario should be based on reality as applicable to the organisation concerned e.g. aircraft used (seating capacity), type of operation, routes flown, destinations etc.

All of the appendices in [ERP Part 1 / Volume 5](#) should also be reviewed

[SERP Section 6](#) ('[Station / Destination Airport ERP](#)' Operations) comes next (starts page [63](#))





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SERP - Section 6

ERP Operations at Station / Destination / Landing Airports & Equivalents

(You are reminded that the **SERP** deals with the catastrophic aircraft accident situation **ONLY** i.e. it is not for 'aircraft incidents'; it is not an aviation related 'business continuity' plan; it is not an aviation related pandemic (public health) or natural disaster plan; it is not an aviation related security or safety plan etc.)



As this document (the one you are reading now) is a **SERP** (in contrast to an **ERP**) it is * assumed herein (unless stated otherwise) that resources (finance, facilities, equipment and [most of all] manpower) are **not** plentiful - and we proceed on that assumption

* Where this assumption is wrong **in part**, please adjust the advice given in this Section 6 accordingly. If the assumption is incorrect as **a whole**, then you might be reading the wrong document (e.g. you might need to be using the [separate 'big boys' document] **ERP guideline / template** instead?)





DEFINITION

Airline [Aircraft Operator / Air Carrier]) **Station** ('Outstation'; 'Outport'; 'Regular Landing Airport')

An often used 'general term' for any airport destination on an airline's **regular** route network

A **challenging** aspect of any commercial (and equivalent as required) aircraft operator's (airline's / air carrier's etc.) emergency response planning effort relates to preparation for the 'catastrophic aircraft accident' type scenario - typically assumed to occur e.g. at or near to one of its (* **other than home airport / base**) **stations** - or otherwise other form of **regular destination** landing / take-off facility e. g. helicopter pad; oilrig platform - or even an equivalent facility in the 'middle of nowhere!'

* Catastrophic aircraft accidents can also happen at home airport / base of course. However, due the associated 'familiarity' in the latter scenario - the involved aircraft operator is assumed herein to have a significantly better knowledge of emergency response procedures at said home airport / base - than it will otherwise have at any other airports / equivalent facilities etc. to which it might operate

Better knowledge typically = Better Response

This challenge escalates **significantly** when such preparation extends (as will need to be planned for) to associated **off-station / not at regular destination** type accident situations - and **even more significantly** for locations regarded as being e.g. 'remote'; 'difficult' etc.

The production of appropriate emergency response plans (and implementing them at time of crisis) for such circumstances as described above is, without doubt, one of the most demanding & critical components of the **ENTIRE** emergency planning and response process for associated aircraft operators - and, consequently, the necessary attention, effort and resources required should be given / provided

ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY MATERIAL

The above definition and associated / introductory text, as used herein, covers **any** destination / landing airport or equivalent facility - at which an aircraft operator intends (or is forced) to land / attempt to land - whether it be on the operator's regular route network (if it has one) or not; planned for or not; remote or not etc. Some examples:

- Diversions to alternate airports etc.
- Airports etc. **not** on a **regular** route network
- Any airport etc. used during an emergencyetc.
- The various 'off-airport' type possibilities

Furthermore, it (the terms 'station / destination / landing site' etc. - as used herein) also includes the 'geographical area' in the **vicinity** of any such airports etc. - the meaning of 'vicinity' (as used here) being **deliberately vague**





When the latter 'geographical area' becomes too large / is too remote etc. for the station / destination / landing site / operator HQ etc. to possibly / practicably be able to provide associated emergency response assistance - then provision of same (generally speaking **and from the air carrier / aircraft operator's viewpoints / context *ONLY***) becomes the prime responsibility of said carrier / operator's **GO Team** (if it has one!!!) - but only (obviously) when (if) the latter is capable of arriving in situ / on-scene

Of course (and over and above the considerations documented in the last two paras above), other (mainly 'official / government' type) organisations would also become formally involved in such circumstances e.g. Search and Rescue / Coastguard; Emergency Services; Military; Air Accident Investigation; Appropriate Government etc. agencies.....and so on

BACKGROUND STUDY

You now need to please complete the usual 'speed-read' of (separate 'big boys' document) **ERP Part 1 / Volume 6 - 'Station ERP'** you will find it at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/guideline-template/>

When you get to the above webpage, scroll down until you find the document entitled:

- **CRPM Part 1 (ERP) / Volume 6 - Destination Airport (Station / Outstation / Outport) ERP**

Open the document (click on it) to read it (you will need 'PDF Reader' for this)

The reason for the latter is to provide you with a very basic 'feel' for how 'Station etc. ERP operations' are produced and implemented / managed from the **ERP 'big boys'** viewpoints - thus (hopefully) making the same task in this equivalent **SERP 'Station ERP' - Section 6** somewhat easier, more effective and efficient etc. - whilst also delivering better outcomes

As usual, there is no 'magic bullet' solution to avoid this '**reading the "big boys" ERP**' task!

IMPORTANT NOTE

When the document referred / linked to just above opens, you will need to read the brief contents very carefully in order to be able to then easily follow the **further 'instructions'** you will find therein

A comprehensive **explanation** for why the above is required is also provided there. You should **read the explanation** and then **follow the instruction**

Essentially, the instruction will guide you to yet another (different) document - which is actually the one that you need to have the 'speed read' of and refer to - in order to successfully complete **this** (separate) **SERP Section 6**

This **SERP Section 6** now continues on the assumption that the above 'further instructions' **have** been followed / accomplished





As mentioned, station / destination / landing airport type **SERP** ops are, **by far**, the most challenging to plan for and accomplish / implement / respond to - in a 'fit for purpose' manner. This particularly applies to aircraft operators / air carriers etc. engaged in **passenger** carrying operations

There are a number of valid reasons for the existence of such challenge (not gone into herein except for what follows just below) - but the main one insofar as air carriers / operators etc. are concerned - is that there is a **very** significant risk that emergency response ops at said * destination / landing airport etc. might be 'unfit for purpose' in varying degree - quite possibly even to the extent of being 'non-existent'

* That is (and very generally speaking) any destination / landing airport or equivalent - where the air carrier / operator does **not** have **near immediate** opportunity to implement **its own SERP** (including deployment of its own emergency response resources [if any] at or to said location) - and is thus reliant on 'others' (directly and / or indirectly representing the carrier / operator [e.g. the accident airport; the local handling agent]) to initially respond to the emergency - on its behalf

The above assumes further, of course, that the carrier / operator itself has a 'fit for purpose' SERP in the first place and that the associated 'accident airport' 'handling agent' etc. are adequately competent and equipped etc. for what it is that they 'might need to do' - both of which (and more) might be very risky assumptions!

It is also worth noting that aircraft operator / air carrier etc. employees (i.e. not just the senior managers) are today potentially exposed to legal consequences (of negligence and similar) with regard to such **SERP** preparation and associated matters / operations / response. The 'consequences can include heavy fines; imprisonment etc.

Because of the degree of risk (to the air carrier / operator etc.) involved in **not** conducting (for whatever reason) fit for purpose **station / destination airport etc. SERP** ops (when required and as described), the author of this info article has 'decided' that it would be irresponsible (of him) to try to summarise / shorten / précis etc. in this **SERP Section 6** - what is already contained (in significantly more detail) in the associated / equivalent (separate document) **ERP** (full / 'big boys') version

To make the previous para absolutely clear, the author clearly states here that the 'interested' user / reader should take his / her required pre-planning etc. information **DIRECTLY** from the **final** document described in the 'IMPORTANT NOTE' on the previous page - and adjust, adapt, downsize it accordingly for the purposes of the specific circumstances applying to the particular (smaller / simpler etc.) air carrier / operator etc.

Accordingly, nothing more on this subject will appear hereafter in this **SERP Section 6** - except for what is written (starting) just below

For.....'Business / Corporate / Ad Hoc / On Demand' type Aviation Organisations and Similar

Due to the nature of the above operations - associated operators face a particular problem (for which 'workarounds' should be found where feasible) related to the provision of Station / Destination Airport SERP etc. type operations / activities etc. as described herein..... i.e. as provided specifically by the air carrier / aircraft operator and / or its third party representatives etc.





Said problem relates to the fact that 'you' will often **not** typically know 'where you are going to operate to' until a 'booking' for your services is made - and often such (ad hoc) bookings are made at short and even very short notice (perhaps a matter of only an hour or two before departure - in some circumstances)

Consequently, (and unlike your scheduled / regular public transport air carrier /aircraft operator counterparts) you will generally not be able to **adequately pre-plan** for the provision of the required / your own (directly and / or as delegated [typically to 'local' ground handling staff / FBO]) Station / Destination Airport SERP services, at many (if not most) of such ad hoc destination airports

The above typically relates to not being able to adequately **pre** co-ordinate your own **SERP** with the 'airport emergency plan - **AEP**' of the destination airport, which is a very significant **adverse** factor - the consequences of which (from an emergency response viewpoint) should not be underestimated

For the same reason, you might also be working with a * 'ground handling agent - **GHA**' you have never worked with before, and thus the opportunity (as with the **AEP** situation above) of adequately **pre** co-ordinating your own **SERP** with such agent's own ERP (if it has one - many do not!) is not available. Again, the adverse consequences of same should not be underestimated

* Possibly better known to business aviation carriers / operators (especially in the USA) as a 'fixed based operator - **FBO**'. It is this handling agent / FBO that would **initially** need to respond (on your behalf) locally - to any emergency involving one of your aircraft, at the associated airport / location

In the above circumstances, perhaps the only viable solution is to **pre**-request the (destination airport) ground handling agent's / FBO's assistance (in the event of the organisation's aircraft having a major accident at / near such airport) - **at the same time** as the 'normal' ground handling services request is sent (to such agent / FBO) by the air carrier / operator. The main advantage here is that the specific agent / FBO concerned **should** already be ** familiar with the **AEP** of the airport at which it operates

** Again, this is a risky assumption - but it is probably the best that you can plan on

For an example of a generic (emergency response) checklist which you can forward to the agent / FBO as per the last paragraph just above - see page 45 of **this** document (i.e. the one which you are reading now)

Note that such agent / FBO may (and is entitled to) make an extra charge for such service

SERP Section 7 - 'Crisis Support Unit - CSU' Operations - comes next (starts page 70)





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SERP - Section 7

Crisis Support Unit Operations

(You are reminded that the **SERP** deals with the catastrophic aircraft accident situation **ONLY** i.e. it is not for 'aircraft incidents'; it is not an aviation related 'business continuity' plan; it is not an aviation related pandemic [public health] or natural disaster plan; it is not an aviation related security or safety plan etc.)



As this document (the one you are reading now) is a **SERP** (in contrast to an **ERP**) it is * assumed herein that resources (finance, facilities, equipment and [most of all] manpower) are **not** plentiful.
We now proceed on that assumption

* Where this assumption is wrong **in part**, please adjust the advice given in this Section 7 accordingly. If the assumption is incorrect as **a whole**, then you might be reading the wrong document (e.g. you might need to be using the [separate 'big boys' document] [ERP guideline / template](#) instead)





You now need to please have the usual 'speed-read' of (separate 'big boys' document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 7 - 'Crisis Support Unit Operations'](#) (101 pages) you will find it at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/guideline-template/>

When you get to the above webpage, scroll down until you find the document entitled:

- [CRPM Part 1 \(ERP\) / Volume 7 - Crisis Support Unit Operations](#)

Open the document (click on it) to read it (you will need 'PDF Reader' for this)

The reason for this rapid read through is to provide you with a very basic 'feel' for how the Crisis Support Unit (CSU) concept is produced and managed from the [ERP](#) viewpoint - thus (hopefully) making the same task in this equivalent [SERP 'CSU' Section](#) somewhat easier, more effective & efficient - whilst also delivering better outcomes

As usual, there is no 'magic bullet' solution to avoid this 'reading the "big boys" ERP' task!

What is a Crisis Support Unit - CSU?

See the explanation of what a '[big boy](#)' air carrier / aircraft operator CSU is - found in (separate document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 7](#) - pages 9 to 11 Then also take a look at pages 22 and 23 - where you will note which associated departments / business units are typically required to form and operate CSUs. The same principle applies (with necessary adaptation) to [smaller / simpler aircraft operators etc.](#)

To see an example summary of the typical roles and responsibilities of a '[big boy](#)' CSU ([Flight Operations 'CSU'](#) in this case) - see page 26 of the above [ERP Part 1 / Vol 7](#)

To see a summary of the typical roles / responsibilities of most other (typical) '[big boy](#)' CSUs - see appendix A of that same document (starts page 60)

What Is Typically Required and Expected of a CSU?

If your organisation is to be reasonably capable of conducting the effective, efficient and expedient Crisis Support Unit operations required (following a catastrophic type aircraft accident) - you will probably need to firstly have most if not all of the following in place / capable of being rapidly arranged (to a greater or lesser degree, depending on 'what your organisation does; how it does it; resources available etc.') - and also documented in an appropriate plan (i.e. in your [SERP - Section 7](#)):

- [The CSUs \(Themselves\)](#)

The principle of the 'CSU' applies to just about [all](#) air carriers / aircraft operators which carry passengers - and also to many other types of air operation. This includes the smaller / simpler etc. aircraft operators / air carriers - which are, of course, the subject of [this](#) information article





For the latter, it will be necessary to adapt, adjust and downsize the associated (separate 'big boys' document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 7](#) info to suit your own ([SERP](#)) circumstances e.g. a lack of resources might mean combining certain (different) CSUs together (such as Flight Operations + Cabin Crew; such as Safety + Security; such as Customer Services + Marketing; such as Finance + Insurance + Legal etc.) under just one (single) 'combined / unified' CSU management per each example just given. To achieve this latter successfully, a degree of cross-training in the * 'other CSU's roles & responsibilities' will be necessary

* As an example, take a 'combined' CSU representing Finance, Legal and Insurance departments / business units - and assume that just two persons are assigned to 'run' this combined CSU - both during normal operations (ERP planning and preparation, training etc. for their CSUs) and during actual or exercise emergency response operations

To make this example a little more 'extreme' - let's further assume that both CSU 'reps' are from the organisation's **Finance** department / business unit.....in which case **each** such rep will require a certain degree of additional **cross-training** in **both** the 'normal business' and 'emergency response' roles and responsibilities of the associated **Insurance** and **Legal** departments / business units etc.

- **CSU Representative(s)**

CSU reps / deputy reps need to be appointed, trained (initial and recurrent) and exercised (ongoing). The latter (re emergency response roles and responsibilities **specific to the CSU**) is typically undertaken by the organisation's **Emergency Planning Manager** (EPM)

For the smaller / simpler aircraft operator / air carrier, the CSU rep(s) is / are probably also the CSU itself (i.e. a 1 or 2 person CSU [in contrast to the 'big boys' where e.g. a 'large' CSU might typically comprise a 'rep'; a 'deputy rep' and 'members' - in total comprising up to 10 or more persons. 'Flight Operations' and 'Cabin Crew / Services' are typical examples of such 'large' CSUs in 'big boy' airlines])

For more information, see (separate document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 7](#) - pages 28 to 36

- **A 'CSU Specific' Emergency Response Plan**

CSU reps are responsible, under the close guidance / mentoring of / by the EPM - **for producing their ** own customised 'CSU emergency response plans'** - specific and directly related to what the CSU 'does' as a matter of normal business e.g. the 'Flight Ops CSU Plan' **only** reflects the emergency response requirements / obligations of the Flight Ops department / business unit. Such CSU emergency response plans might be regarded as being subordinate components of [Section 7](#) of the associated [SERP](#)

** From the first para at the top of this page the reader will have noted that some CSUs might need to 'combine / group' in order to provide adequate **manpower** resources, so as to achieve what is required'. However, such 'combination / grouping' does not extend to producing individual CSU plans. That is, the latter can only be produced by the associated specialist. For example, even though Flight Ops and Cabin Crew CSUs might be combined for better use of (in short supply) manpower - the Flight Ops rep cannot produce a Cabin Crew CSU emergency plan - and vice versa. However, they can (and should) assist each other in the actual execution of such plans - provided that the required joint training and exercising has been completed and is current





Three key components are essential to any CSU plan. These are:

- A simple, **bullet point list** of a particular CSU's roles, responsibilities, accountabilities and duties - both pre-crisis and during crisis itself. See (separate document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 7](#) - page 26 for an example. Also see [appendix A](#) (starts page 60) of that same document
- For any particular bullet point item (as referred to just above) which requires a fair degree of detail to be provided in order for it to be 'done / accomplished / carried out', an associated '**procedure**' should be produced. See [ERP Part 1 / Volume 7](#) - pages 34 to 36 for more details
- For any procedure produced as per above, an associated '**checklist**' must also be produced. See [ERP Part 1 / Volume 7](#) - pages 52 to 56 for more details

For the purposes of **standardisation**, all CSU plans should be produced in accordance with an appropriate template. See [ERP Part 1 / Volume 7](#) - pages 20 and 21 for further information

▪ **CSU - Operating Location(s)**

From Section 2 of this **SERP** the reader will recall that the emergency response 'command and control' model recommended does **not** involve CSUs operating from the organisation's Crisis Management Centre. Rather, they (CSUs) operate (conduct their specific emergency response duties) from their normal place of work (office / workstation etc.). It will also be recalled that most CSUs are additionally required to contribute manpower to any 'aircraft operator' GO Team required to deploy (as appropriate)

▪ **CSU - 24 hour Operating Capability**

As the consequences of a catastrophic aircraft accident can exist 24H for some time (weeks and even months in extremis) an organisation's emergency response plan must thus also be capable of 24H operation for the duration of any crisis

This requirement will obviously pose particular difficulties for many smaller / simpler operators (particularly from the manpower viewpoint) - **BUT** - must nevertheless still be managed and delivered as best as is possible - considering actual circumstances 'on the day'

As previously mentioned elsewhere in **this** info article, the latter means that some CSUs might be represented 24H by just a single person (the one person CSU!) i.e. there is absolutely no one else available and capable of delivering what is required. In such circumstances said 'single person CSU' must 'somehow' be available 24 / 7 for emergency response duties - and **might** also concurrently need to handle the 'normal' ops for which he / she still remains responsible





Whilst the above requirement might seem, at first thought, to be impossible (e.g. such person is entitled to time-off work and leave / vacation time; may get sick etc.) - there are way and means of at least partially achieving what is required. Some examples have already been discussed on page 19 of [this](#) information article. The examples given are not exhaustive - i.e. think 'outside of the box'!

An undesirable consequence here (during emergency response ops) might include making a choice as to deploy such 'single' person with the GO Team (where such deployment is required) [OR](#) keeping them at airline HQ for CSU duties. In most circumstances it is expected that the latter will typically be overriding

Further Reading

Please now look again at the other elements of (separate '[big boy](#)' document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 7](#) which you may have already 'sped-read' - but which have not yet been specifically cross-referred to further as per [this](#) Section 7 of the [SERP](#)

In particular you need to understand and then action the requirements of [Chapter 4](#) (starts page 38), [Chapter 5](#) (starts page 43) and [Chapter 6](#) (page 47). Adapt, adjust and downsize accordingly as per the circumstances of your own organisation

[SERP Section 8 - 'Integrated Emergency Response' Operations comes next](#) (starts page 76)





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SERP - Section 8

Integrated (Joint) Emergency Response Operations

(You are reminded that the **SERP** deals with the catastrophic aircraft accident situation **ONLY** i.e. it is not for 'aircraft incidents'; it is not an aviation related 'business continuity' plan; it is not an aviation related pandemic (public health) or natural disaster plan; it is not an aviation related security or safety plan etc.)



As this document (the one you are reading now) is a **SERP** (in contrast to an **ERP**) it is * assumed herein that resources (finance, facilities, equipment and [most of all] manpower) are **not** plentiful.
We now proceed on that assumption

* Where this assumption is wrong **in part**, please adjust the advice given in this Section 8 accordingly. If the assumption is incorrect as **a whole**, then you might be reading the wrong document (e.g. you might need to be using the [separate / associated 'big boys' document] [ERP guideline / template](#) instead)





You now need to please have the usual 'speed-read' of (separate 'big boys' document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 8 - 'Integrated Emergency Response Operations'](#) (81 pages) you will find it at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/guideline-template/>

When you get to the above webpage, scroll down until you find the document entitled:

- [CRPM Part 1 \(ERP\) / Volume 8 - Integrated Emergency Response Operations](#)

Open the document (click on it) to read it (you will need 'PDF Reader' for this)

The reason for this rapid read through is to provide you with a very basic 'feel' for how 'Integrated Emergency Response Ops' (IEO) are produced and managed from the [ERP](#) ('big boys') viewpoints - thus (hopefully) making the same task in this equivalent [SERP 'IEO' Section](#) somewhat easier, more effective & efficient etc. - whilst also delivering better outcomes

As usual, there is no 'magic bullet' solution to avoid this 'reading the "big boys" ERP' task!

What are Integrated Emergency Response Operations? (IEO)

See definition found in (separate document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 8](#) - page 17

What Is Typically Required and Expected from the Smaller / Simpler Air Carrier / Operator?

Because of the nature of their operations, it is assumed herein (hopefully a reasonably assumption!) that the greater majority of smaller / simpler air carriers / aircraft operators can ignore this [SERP Section 8](#) - as they do not typically engage in integrated operations with other air carriers / aircraft operators etc. (and thus, by extension, do not have a significant interest in integrated emergency response ops)

For the (anticipated) very small number which *might* have such an interest, see [ERP Part 1 / Volume 8](#) - and then adapt, adjust, downsize etc. the info contained therein - to suit your own particular purposes accordingly

For '*feeder*' type passenger air carriers / aircraft operators, see the information shown near the bottom of page 25 of [this](#) info article

[SERP Section 9 - 'Crisis Communications' Operations](#) comes next (starts page 79)





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SERP - Section 9


Crisis Communications

(You are reminded that the **SERP** deals with the catastrophic aircraft accident situation **ONLY** i.e. it is not for 'aircraft incidents'; it is not an aviation related 'business continuity' plan; it is not an aviation related pandemic (public health) or natural disaster plan; it is not an aviation related security or safety plan etc.)



As this document (the one you are reading now) is a **SERP** (in contrast to an **ERP**) it is  assumed herein that resources (finance, facilities, equipment and [most of all] manpower) are **not** plentiful

We now proceed on that assumption

 Where this assumption is wrong **in part**, please adjust the advice given in this Section 9 accordingly. If the assumption is incorrect as **a whole**, then you might be reading the wrong document (e.g. you might need to be using the [separate '**big boys**' document] [ERP guideline / template](#) instead)





You now need to please have the usual 'speed-read' of (separate 'big boys' document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 9 - 'Crisis Communications Operations'](#) (192 pages) you will find it at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/guideline-template/>

When you get to the above webpage, scroll down until you find the document entitled:

- [CRPM Part 1 \(ERP\) / Volume 9 - Crisis Communications](#)

Open the document (click on it) to read it (you will need 'PDF Reader' for this)

The reason for this 'rapid' read-through is to provide a very basic 'feel' for how 'Crisis Comms' type ops are planned for, produced and managed from [ERP](#) ('big boys') viewpoints - thus (hopefully) making the same task in this equivalent [SERP 'Crisis Comms' Section](#) somewhat easier, effective & efficient - whilst also delivering better outcomes

As usual, there is no 'magic bullet' solution to avoid this 'reading the "big boys" ERP' task!

What is the meaning of the term '[Crisis Communications](#)'?

DEFINITION: Air Carrier / Aircraft Operator etc. - [Crisis Communications](#)

The art, science, technique, preparation, implementation and distribution.....of effective, efficient, expedient, accurate, consistent, co-ordinated and honest communications - by an air carrier / aircraft operator, with appropriate stakeholders (internal & external) - as related to a * catastrophic aircraft accident type situation (or equivalent severity event), involving one or more of said carrier / operator's aircraft

* Crisis Communications relate to all types of crises of course. However, in **this** information article, the subject is typically referred to in the 'catastrophic aircraft accident' context only

Crisis comms should be managed / delivered etc. with care and compassion where appropriate - particularly when communicating with / about accident victims and associated family, relatives and friends of such victims

Note: Whilst an airline's (as a stakeholder) etc. dealings with the media are traditionally (arguably) considered to be paramount when conducting crisis communications ops - **all other** involved / impacted stakeholders **must** also be given due consideration. As already mentioned a little further above, this is **particularly important** when communicating with / about accident victims and associated (not been on board the accident flight) family, relatives and friends





Background

The (separate document) [‘big boys’ ERP Part 1 / Volume 9](#) is one of the largest (in terms of pages) of the 10 [ERP Part 1 ‘volumes’](#). This is indicative of the importance and scope of crisis communications as related to the catastrophic aircraft accident type situation - particularly as same is the primary ‘public’ interface as to how well (or otherwise) an airline is *perceived* to be handling such situation

The word ‘perceived’ (as used just above) is highlighted as it is possible that no matter how good an airline’s actual emergency response activities might be, if it is generally ‘thought’ to be otherwise - there *may* be adverse consequences for the airline..... harsh / unfair as this might seem to be

Such adverse consequences (deserved or not) typically include (the list is not exhaustive):

- Public criticism
- Loss of custom / business
- Loss of reputation
- Decrease in share value
- Suspension of operations
- Threat and / or use of violence, abuse etc. (verbal and / or physical) to staff etc.
- Legal and judicial - including trials; fines (for airline and / or staff); imprisonment (for staff)
- Going out of business

Of course, *if* it is known (or even strongly suspected) that the accident airline *is* somehow responsible for the crisis in some ‘culpable’ way (e.g. poor or zero accident aircraft maintenance; crew gross negligence etc.) **AND** the associated crisis communications are also poorly handled - then such adverse consequences might be deserved! (other than violence and / or abuse etc. of course)

Although the ‘scale’ will typically be different, the smaller, simpler air carrier / aircraft operator could feasibly face the same type of adverse consequences (as described above) in similar circumstances. Consequently, such carriers / operators should maintain *at least* a ‘reasonable’ crisis comms capability - commensurate with the type of air operation(s) they undertake (passenger type operations are [obviously] particularly vulnerable)

What Is Typically Required / Expected?

Firstly, have a look at (separate document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 9](#) - pages 34 and 35. When you have read and are familiar with these documented requirements (and in conjunction with your senior management [and crisis comms advisors where appropriate]):

- **Choose and appoint the ‘person / people’** (otherwise known as the ‘[name of your organisation] *Crisis Communications Team - CCT*’) - who will be responsible to / with top management for the planning, training, testing and running of your own crisis communications preparations and operations

You may or may not already have a (your own organisation’s) **‘normal business’** Public Relations (PR) capability. If you do, it will typically comprise just one or two persons. Such person(s) should be assigned to the CCT (if not already so)





If you do not already have your own (internal) **PR** capability, you now need to choose and appoint appropriate staff to form the CCT. In such circumstances, the appointee(s) will require the necessary * training and exercising which, in the circumstances, can only be provided by external, third party crisis communications training specialists (i.e. you will need to pay for same - and it can be relatively expensive)

* In reality, and where you **do** have a '**normal** business' PR capability, it is more than likely that the person(s) involved will **not** have received specialist crisis communications training (or e.g. such training may be so 'way out of date' as to be 'unacceptable'). If this is the case, then such person(s) also require the external training and exercising referred to immediately above

Regardless of the manpower strength of your organisation in general, a minimum of two (ideally three or four) persons should comprise the CCT. Where you already have a 'normal business' PR capability but e.g. with a manpower of just one, you will need to appoint and train etc. at least one (ideally, two or three) extra person(s) to make up the shortfall

Leave, duty travel etc. should be managed such that **at least** one CCT member is always available for crisis communications duties at very short notice, for the entire period during which the organisation is conducting actual flight operations

Ideally, a member of the CCT should be included in any required GO Team deployment

Where considered appropriate (and assuming financial resources so permit) - an **external**, third party crisis communications specialist / expert (single person or business) may be engaged to additionally assist the organisation with its crisis comms accountabilities (i.e. augmenting the organisation's own CCT - but **never** replacing it altogether)

- **Produce the Crisis Communications Plan - CCP** (for your own organisation). See again 'roman' number I. - on page 34 of (separate document) **ERP Part 1 - Volume 9**. See also the bullet point list on page 36 of that same document - for a list of the issues which the '**big boys**' would need to consider when putting together their own crisis comms response (and thus their own CCPs).....**and then adjust, adapt, downsize them accordingly, to fit the circumstances of your own organisation**
- **Train** (initial and recurrent) the **CCP** to all required recipients. The latter typically comprise the CCT + other staff required to have a pre-specified level of CCP knowledge - as required to undertake associated emergency response accountabilities e.g. typically the Crisis Director; Company Spokesperson (if not part of the CCT) etc.
- **Exercise** (ongoing schedule) the CCP with the same, required recipients - as referred to in the bullet point just above
- Choose, appoint and train /exercise appropriate staff for the role of the '**organisation's** (company) **spokesperson**'

Note - such persons (there should ideally be at least two) are likely to be appointed from the organisation's senior management team, including the 'top' manager. This is a fairly specialist role which requires appropriate training and exercising (initial / recurrent / ongoing) - typically only available from external (third party) specialists. Again, such training is not cheap - but is essential





- Integrate the appropriate parts (of what is already documented above) into the organisation's '**alerting and activation**' system i.e. how the CCT itself will be alerted to a crisis situation and, in turn, how it (the CCT) will alert other stakeholders associated (in one way or another) with the organisation's crisis comms response. It is implicit here that whoever gets **alerted** is thereafter responsible for **activating** any crisis communications accountabilities - for which the alerted person(s) is / are then responsible
- **Identify and document all appropriate stakeholders** (internal **and** external to the organisation) who might feasibly be involved and / or otherwise 'have an interest' in the organisation's crisis comms ops / outputs. All and any **contact information** for same must also be collected, safeguarded, documented and maintained 'up to date' (where same is practicably available / possible). Such information should be regarded as a 'notional' attachment to the CCP i.e. it forms part of the CCP administratively speaking, but should be a physically separate document. For simplicity purposes the latter attachment may be regarded as the CCP's '**contacts directory**'and, as such, is also thus an integral parts of the CCP's '**alerting and activation**' system

The contacts directory must always be available in hard copy format. It should additionally be available in soft copy format. At least one (separate) hard copy should be located at a location which will account for business continuity requirements

- As required - **undertake a critical review of your CCP** with a view to ensuring that it is as '**fit for purpose**' as possible. Whilst doing this, **identify any outstanding problem areas** (actual and potential) to which there are currently no satisfactory resolutions - with a view to finding such resolution. If latter is (rarely) not possible, notify top management of the potential risk(s) involved (you will at least be aware of the problem area - and be ready with an appropriate 'explanation(s)' [if required] on the day of the crisis!)
- **Develop & document** a suitable & appropriate '**holding**' **Press Release template** - fit for near immediate / very rapid issue, following declaration of a major crisis. The next two or three subsequent statements should also be **partially pre-prepared**, leaving gaps for insertion of appropriate information, which can only become available 'on the day'

Such holding press release templates **must** be developed **in advance** for use in a wide variety of scenario types, to which the organisation is perceived to be vulnerable. An example of a typical **holding** (first) press release might be as simple as:

Date: [insert]

Time: [insert]

Press Release No: [insert]

Title (as required)

A possible incident has been reported today (date) involving Flight AB xxx from (departure airport) to (destination airport). We have activated ABCX Airways emergency response procedures as a precaution. Our primary concern right now is for all on board this flight and their (non-flying / not on board the flight) families, relatives and friends

More information will be released ASAP - see also www.abcxairways.com +





As mentioned, templates for **subsequent** press releases should also be **pre-prepared** where thought prudent. The CCT should regularly review same to determine if they require revision and / or whether further press releases for other scenarios should also be developed

- Pre-plan and resource for effective and efficient 'emergency related' use of the company website (**dark site operations**) and **social media** ops - as appropriate. See (separate document) **ERP Part 1 / Volume 9** - pages 30 and 31 respectively, for more information

WARNING - smaller / simpler organisations should typically only use their Social Media resource(s) (if any) to 'send / transmit / push' emergency related information. Do **NOT** enter into 2-way ('receive / pull') social media 'conversations' with anyone, unless you are absolutely certain that you have the capabilities (particularly trained manpower in required numbers), facilities and can spare the time (**all of which will be extremely unlikely**)

- At the start of actual crisis response ops - formulate an appropriate **crisis communications strategy** based on actual circumstances 'on the day'; implement it; assess and continually re-assess it - and **use the CCP and current strategy to guide the appropriate response**

For more on 'crisis communications strategy' see (separate document) **ERP Part 1 / Volume 9** - page 37

Note well that the CCP must **ONLY** ever be considered as a guide to an appropriate, associated response. It can never make up for human leadership, flexibility, initiative, common sense, logic, knowledge, experience etc. - all of which (& more) will be critical to successful outcomes 'on the day'

The **Crisis Support Unit** (CSU) versus the **Crisis Communications Team** (CCT)

You will recall from **Section 7** of this **SERP** - the concept and operation of the department / business unit 'Crisis Support Unit - CSU'. As a quick refresher, take a look now (as required) at (separate 'big boy' document) **ERP Part 1 / Volume 9** - pages 39 and 40

Whilst the organisation's (aircraft operator etc.) PR department / business unit etc. (assuming that it has one???) is required to form a CSU (like most other departments / business units in the organisation), its vital role in dealing with external entities on various critical issues (which, if not managed competently, could potentially cause significant damage to the parent organisation) warrants it taking on the more specialist title of '**Crisis Communications Team - CCT**' - rather than e.g. the 'PR CSU'

Nevertheless, the CCT typically follows the same principles as any other CSU, in preparing for and conducting its associated emergency response operations

CCT - Constitution

Take a look again now at (separate document) **ERP Part 1 / Volume 9** - pages 44 and 45





What you are looking at here is how the best resourced and most capable of the 'big boy' airlines will **typically** man their CCTs during actual crisis response operations. The essential posts / assignments are exactly that i.e. **ESSENTIAL!** It is also important to fill the **DESIRABLE** posts - if the crisis comms response is going to be as 'good as it can get' in the circumstances

What you need at the (equivalent) smaller / simpler organisation level is to get as close to what is described just above - as it is possible to get, commensurate with the **availability** and **capabilities** of your own resources. We have already discussed (pages 18 to 25 of **this** info article) the 'lack of resources' problem and some possible workarounds

Capabilities, on the other hand, will be developed via **training** and more training - and same goes for **exercising**

For many smaller / simpler organisations, 'getting as close as it is possible to get' as per the last 2 paragraphs above **MUST** be achieved, but even then - will typically still not be anywhere near enough i.e. you will almost certainly still need external, specialist help - and same comes, as always, at a cost

Crisis Communications - External (Third Party) Specialist / Expert Support

See again pages 24 and 25 of the document which you are reading now - and then return here

You will note that most of the external organisations listed on page 25 offer 'crisis communications' services. However, if you think (by engaging same) that all of your crisis communications problems will be solved - think again!

You must still put in place (to the maximum extent possible - commensurate with the resources and capabilities of your own organisation) everything already referred to in **this Section 9**. Engaging an external organisation to provide crisis communications services will then help (repeat.....help) to fill in any gaps remaining (and there almost certainly will still be considerable gaps!)

The best of the third party organisations might typically provide something like the following, if you engage their crisis communications services ('mix and match' which particular services you need [remember - you will need to pay for them]):

- Experienced crisis comms professional(s) will (upon activation) travel to any location specified (typically this will be to the accident airline's HQ' location)
- Immediate & continuous (specialist) telephone support provided until above person(s) (documented Immediately above) arrives where needed
- 24H international monitoring and feedback of media (TV, radio, press, internet / social media etc.)
- Advice on content and timing of media releases / statements
- Arranging translation & distribution of media releases etc. to local & international media
- Arranging and moderating media interviews, briefings etc.
- Advice on content, tone and timing of media briefings etc.
- Preparation of spokespersons for media interviews, briefings etc.





Note well that useful as the above 'externally provided' services might be, the buck for providing the 'nuts and bolts' of a crisis communications operation always remains with the organisation 'in crisis'

Note - retaining such external services is usually via annual subscription, the cost of which will generally be considered reasonable by many organisations. However, the costs of using such services for real (in action) can become quite expensive. As always recommended in this article, you should take out appropriate insurance to cover the costs of implementing all appropriate aspects of your emergency response plan - including fees, costs and expenses charged / incurred by engaged third parties - such as those described above

Putting the Crisis Communications Plan Together

Pedantically speaking the Crisis Communications Team (CCT) is just another 'crisis support unit' and consequently (and for very valid reasons - one of which is standardisation) putting together the CCT's own, bespoke emergency response plan (known herein as the 'Crisis Communication Plan - CCP') should follow the general format / layout etc. (but not specific content of course) of all other CSU plans within the organisation

For more on CSU plan format / layout etc. - see [Section 7](#) of [this](#) info article

You will then also need to further review [Chapters 1C, 3C](#) and [Chapters 4 to 7](#) of (separate 'big boy' document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 9](#) - to further guide you in how you might specifically put together your own CCP. Adapt, adjust and downsize this information accordingly to suit the specific purposes of your own organisation

Further Reading

A significant amount of potentially very useful information (related to air carrier/ aircraft operator crisis communications planning and operations) will be found in the appendices to (separate document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 9](#). Please do have a look at these appendices, take from them what you need - and (as always) adapt, adjust and downsize

[SERP Section 10 - 'Emergency Response Exercises'](#) comes next (starts page [88](#))





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SERP - Section 10

Exercising the Emergency Response Plan

(You are reminded that the **SERP** deals with the catastrophic aircraft accident situation **ONLY** i.e. it is not for 'aircraft incidents'; it is not an aviation related 'business continuity' plan; it is not an aviation related pandemic (public health) or natural disaster plan; it is not an aviation related security or safety plan etc.)



Image: EPA/MADE NAGI

As this document (the one you are reading now) is an **SERP** (in contrast to an **ERP**) it is ***** assumed herein that resources (finance, facilities, equipment and [most of all] manpower) are **not** plentiful - and we will proceed on that assumption

***** Where this assumption is wrong **in part**, please adjust the advice given in this Section 10 accordingly. If the assumption is incorrect as **a whole**, then you might be reading the wrong document (e.g. you might need to be using the [separate / equivalent 'big boys' document] [ERP guideline / template](#) instead)





You now need to please have the usual 'speed-read' of (separate 'big boys' document) [ERP Part 1 / Volume 10 - 'Emergency Response Exercises \(for Aircraft Operators\)'](#) (105 pages) you will find it at:

<https://www.aviationemergencyresponseplan.com/guideline-template/>

When you get to the above webpage, scroll down until you find the document entitled:

- [CRPM Part 1 \(ERP\) / Volume 10 - ERP Exercise Planning](#)

Open the document (click on it) to read it (you will need 'PDF Reader' for this)

The reason for this rapid read through is to provide a very basic 'feel' for how Exercises are produced / managed from the [ERP \('big boys'\)](#) viewpoints - thus (hopefully) making the same task in this equivalent [SERP 'ERP Exercises' Section](#) somewhat easier, more effective and efficient - whilst also delivering better outcomes

As usual, there is no 'magic bullet' solution to avoid this '[reading the "big boys" ERP](#)' task!

Background

Please look more closely now at the information provided in (separate document) [ERP Part 1 - Volume 10](#) - pages 19 to 24. This info should be interpreted, adapted, adjusted and downsized etc. - such that it **fits / meets the ERP exercise requirements of your own organisation**

No matter what the size / simplicity of the latter (own organisation) - it is absolutely, 100% possible to run meaningful emergency response exercises provided that:

- A reasonably well prepared and 'workable' ERP for the organisation is already in place
- An appropriate number of staff are available to participate, commensurate with the ERP's manpower requirements
- All such staff have been adequately trained (initial & recurrent) in their ERP accountabilities
- The * 'author / facilitator etc.' of the ERP exercise(s) knows what he / she is doing - and is also given adequate time and (the minimal) resources (including budget) required to 'write, produce, conduct and debrief' same in an effective and efficient manner

* Typically the organisation's Emergency (Response) Planning Manager - EPM / equivalent person

- Top management buy-in of the whole ERP concept has been accomplished

Next Step

It would be difficult and unproductive to try to condense the associated [ERP Part 1 - Volume 10 \('big-boys'\)](#) information (found on pages 31 to 105 of that document) - into this [SERP](#)

Accordingly, the user / reader should, instead - take, adapt and use such information - **directly** from said [ERP Vol 10](#)





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Appendix A

Understanding the CONTEXT of this Information Article (the one you are reading right now)

In order to provide some further understanding of the types of air carrier / air operation etc. which might benefit by preparing or upgrading their emergency response plans in alignment with the content of **this** information article (i.e. with the **SERP**) - please take a look at the contextual information provided on the following pages 93 to 112

(NB: the info so provided is not exhaustive i.e. it is **representative only** of some of the types of air carrier [and / or air operations] which are the intended targets of **this** article

Note also that the following was included herein in **2015** - and has **not** subsequently been updated. The reader should account for this accordingly - e.g. ICAO SMS requirements for **aviation related ERP type matters** were only in their 'infancy' in 2015 - whereas by around 2022 they were just about fully developed. Accordingly, further research will be required if the 'interested' reader is desirous of 'updating' what follows on below (however, do note that significant change is not anticipated)





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IATA's Standard Safety Assessment (ISSA - first introduced in early 2015)

The **ISSA** is a voluntary evaluation programme (produced by IATA [International Air Transport Association] at the request of appropriate sections of the aviation industry) to extend the benefits of operational safety and efficiency (emanating from the [different / separate but similar in what is trying to be achieved] IATA Operational Safety Audit [**IOSA**] Programme) - to commercial air transport operators of **smaller** (and thus probably [but not necessarily] 'simpler' also) **aircraft**. The latter were not eligible for said **IOSA** audit - which is essentially applied to 'big boy' airlines

The ISSA programme offers entry into an IATA 'Assessment Registry' - for air carriers using aircraft with a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) below 5,700 kg.....and contains / includes elements related to **emergency response planning**

Benefits of ISSA

- Global safety standard for **commercial** operators not covered by existing IATA operational safety audit programmes
- Measuring operator's **conformity** with relevant ICAO requirements
- **Gradual** implementation of safety management system (SMS) elements (by 2018)
- Assessment completion provides eligibility for entry into IATA's ISSA Registry
- Potential improved marketing and commercial advantages for operators
- Potential improved conditions for reduction of insurance premiums

ISSM and ISARPS

An associated **ISSA Standards Manual** (ISSM) was published in order to provide the associated **ISSA standards and recommended practices** (* ISARPs) required - together with associated guidance material and other supporting information, necessary for an operator to successfully prepare for an ISSA assessment

The ISSM may also be used **as a guide** by **any** operator (commercial or otherwise; passenger carrying or otherwise; common carriage, non-common carriage or private etc.) desiring to structure its operational management / control systems in conformity with the latest industry operational practices

* The acronym 'ISARPs' would currently (2015) appear to be used by IATA with two different meanings - the first related to '**IOSA** Standards & Recommended Practices' and the second (as used in **this** information article i.e. the document you are reading now) referring to '**ISSA** Standards & Recommended Practices. Is this a mistake by IATA???

The safety and security requirements (published in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation [via ICAO]) are the primary source for specifications contained in ISARPs





Aircraft Operators / Air Carriers etc. - Applicability

As at mid-2015 (reader should check for latest updates) ISSA was only applicable for assessing operators / carriers etc. - meeting the following criteria:

- Commercial passenger and / or cargo operations
- Aircraft with one or more *turbine* powered and / or multiple *reciprocating* engines
- One or two-pilot operations
- IFR and / or VFR operations
- Aircraft below 5,700 Kg MTOM

Note: Aircraft **at or above** 5,700 Kg MTOM will be eligible for **one ISSA** initial assessment. Thereafter, the operator will need to pursue an **IOSA** registration initial audit to stay on an IATA Audit registry

ISARPs may not be applied or used for the assessment of operations conducted with:

- Aircraft with single reciprocating engines
- Helicopters
- Seaplanes
- Any operator currently on the IOSA registry
- Operators with no aircraft on their Air Operator's Certificate - AOC (e.g. wet leases ops)

Certain ISARPs are also applicable to **non-commercial** aircraft operations, and such application is indicated in a note that is part of the associated ISSA standard or recommended practice

Other owned or leased aircraft that are not of the type authorised in the AOC and / or not utilised in commercial air transport operations will not be evaluated during an assessment. However, the existence of such aircraft will be referenced (with an associated explanation) in any associated ISSA Assessment Report (IAR)

Comment by Author of this Information Article (ISSM Section 1 [ORG] - 4 [ERP] refers)

ISSM Section1 (ORG) requires (in its clause 4.1.1) that aircraft operators undertaking the ISSA must (shall) ***'have a corporate ERP for the central management and co-ordination of all activities, should it be necessary to respond to a major aircraft accident or other type of adverse event resulting in fatalities, serious injuries, considerable damage and / or significant disruption to operations'***

This information article (the document you are reading now) may be used to assist in achievement of this **mandatory** requirement

Comment by Author of this Information Article (ISSM Section 1 [ORG] - 4 [ERP] refers)

This information article (the document you are reading now) may also be used to assist in achieving the **advisory** requirement of clauses 4.1.4A (Clauses 4.1.2 & 4.1.3 were [as at mid-2015] not in use) - and clause 4.1.4B (latter not scheduled to become effective until November 2018 [makes advisory requirement of 4.1.4A into a mandatory requirement])

The above clauses relate to the ***'inclusion of provisions for appropriate co-ordination with the ERPs of other applicable responding organisations - as relevant to the particular crisis of concern'***





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International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO - initiated 2002)

The International Standard for Business Aircraft Operation (IS-BAO), developed by the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC) and its members, is a code of best practices designed to assist business aviation worldwide to achieve high levels of safety and professionalism. At the core of the IS-BAO is a scalable Safety Management System (SMS) tool for business aircraft operators - ranging from single aircraft / single-pilot operations to large multi-aircraft flight departments

IS-BAO:

- Promotes use of high quality operating practices for international business aircraft operations
- Provides baseline requirements for structuring flight departments - together with planning and conduct of their operations
- Challenges flight departments to review current systems, programmes and procedures; recognise strengths and weaknesses in the latter - and subsequently upgrade to a higher standard where appropriate

IS-BAO is based on International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards and recommended practices (SARPS), which prepare the operator for both domestic and international operations. It (IS-BAO) is additionally an industry code of best practices developed by the international business aviation community for the benefit its members - designed to build on the excellent safety record already established in this field of operations

Conforming to IS-BAO requirements is voluntary and may be self-administered. However, recognition for implementation of and conformance is available via an auditing process - resulting in an 'IBAC Certificate of Registration'. Audits conducted every two years ensure conformance with the standard and provide valuable feedback to the operator. The registration certificate issued upon successful completion of an audit serves as proof of compliance with several key ICAO standards, which are required for operations in a number of countries

IS-BAO comprises a set of standards and recommended practices which operators follow to achieve programme registration. **From the ERP viewpoint**, these standards specify that:

- An operator **shall** have a plan detailing the procedures to be followed in the event of an accident, incident or other emergency. Compliance with the plan is mandatory in the case of accidents involving substantial damage to aircraft or injury to passengers, crew members or persons on the ground. In the case of other accidents, incidents or emergencies - compliance will be at the discretion of the operator, subject to any requirements imposed in law by the State (Country) of Registration - and / or the law of the State in which the accident or incident occurred
- The emergency response plan **shall** address in-flight incidents involving injuries to, or serious medical problems suffered by, passengers and / or crew members
- The emergency response plan **shall** address accidents and incidents not involving aircraft flight operations, such as those occurring during aircraft maintenance activities





- The emergency response plan **shall** include, as applicable:
 - Procedures to be taken by the crew (where possible) to assist passengers and ground victims, seek medical assistance, prepare visual distress signals (e.g. if in a remote area) - and preserve the integrity of the accident site
 - Procedures (depending on nature & location of the accident) for the flight crew to notify the appropriate authority in the state (country) where the accident occurred
 - Procedures to notify designated company officials of the accident, incident or event
 - Procedures for the company to notify appropriate additional state / country authorities of the accident, as may be required by law etc.
 - Procedures for accident notification to associated next of kin / equivalent persons
 - Procedures for dealing with questions from, and providing assistance to, the families of passengers and crew members
 - Procedures for 'quarantining' of appropriate documents and records relating to the accident flight
 - Procedures for dealing with the media
 - Procedures for participating and / or co-operating with state / country etc. agencies and police authorities who may be investigating the accident
 - Considerations for dealing with the effects of the accident on company operations and on employees (e.g. business continuity issues; trauma counselling services and other crisis intervention support for persons involved or affected by the event)
- Personnel who have a role under emergency response plan requirements **should** be trained in that role. The plan **should** also be exercised periodically, in order to test its integrity

Lastly, the importance of having a statement of policy with regard to the ERP is fundamentally important. Without such a policy statement emanating from the **top** of the organisation (top manager), employees might not give it the priority and effort needed to get it right

Comment by Author of this Information Article

This information article (the document you are reading now) may be used to assist in achievement of the above IS-BAO **ERP related** requirements





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Flight Safety Foundation

Basic Aviation Risk Standard Programme (BARS)

Many organisations rely on the use of aviation to support their activities, including the movement of company personnel. Aircraft operators used for such services include those providing dedicated contract support, on-demand charter and regular passenger transport type services. The aircraft used range from small, single-engine helicopters to transport category jet aircraft

The **BARS programme** meets an identified need to establish a common global aviation safety assessment and audit protocol. It is a risk-based model framed against the actual threats posed to aviation operations, particularly those that occur within challenging and remote environments. It directly links these threats to associated controls, recovery and mitigation measures (as opposed to outdated and prescriptive formats previously used within a number of associated industries)

Whilst the programme was originally developed to meet the needs of the mining and resources sector, it is also used today by other organisations using aviation to support their activities. These include government, humanitarian and other aid agencies

The items reviewed during a BARS Audit are referenced and mapped to various sources such as ICAO Annexes, the **IATA** Dangerous Goods Regulations and other authoritative material - making it applicable to a broad category of aircraft operations

Together with additional risk assessment tools, the BARS Programme is a complete package designed to assist organisations with the management of their aviation risk and provides users of aviation support with the level of safety assurance required by their respective organisations

The following is an extract from the BARS Implementation Guidelines document:

12.2 - Emergency Response Plan

The **aircraft operator must** provide a documented **ERP** to give instructions and guidance on the duties and obligations of personnel, following an accident or similar impact (significant) incident

The **company** must document an **ERP** for each **airfield** they operate. An **airfield ERP** (more commonly known as an 'Airport Emergency Plan - AEP') must be appropriate to the aircraft operations and other activities conducted at that location and should provide for the coordination of actions to be taken in an emergency at the airfield or in its vicinity

ERPs should be appropriate to the size, nature and complexity of the operations being undertaken - and should adequately detail and provide for:

- A responsible and qualified person to lead the emergency response
- The duties and responsibilities of other key personnel
- Contact details for all relevant organisations and individuals including those with local search and rescue (SAR) capabilities
- Effective communication between the aircraft operator, company and SAR resources





- A process for periodically checking and updating emergency contact lists..... and
- Conducting periodic, scheduled emergency response drills, exercises and / or tests (if the aircraft operator etc. conducts offshore operations, it should ensure emergency response drills include worst-case scenarios involving considerations such as last-light, significant weather and the time taken to commence search for missing aircraft)

The documented ERPs for both the company and aircraft operator should provide guidance in pre-planning for emergencies, as well as detailing the protocols which will ensure appropriate coordination between the company, aircraft operator and other involved agencies

Comment by Author of this Information Article

This information article (the document you are reading now) may be used to assist in achievement of the above **BARS** programme **ERP related** requirements - as they relate to aircraft operators





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Federal Aviation Administration (USA and its Territories)

FAA Title 14 CFR Parts 121, 125 and 135 define the Operational Requirements for various types of air operations conducted in U.S. airspace

Selected Extracts from DOT / FAA Advisory Circular (120-92B) - dated 08 Jan 2015

This advisory circular (AC) provides information for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) **Part 121 air carriers** which are required to implement Safety Management Systems (SMS) based on **14 CFR Part 5**. Specifically, this document provides a description of regulatory requirements guidance, and methods of developing and implementing an SMS

This AC may also be used by **other** aviation service providers (e.g. those operating under 14 CFR **Parts 125 and 135**) interested in **voluntarily** developing an SMS based on the requirements of said Part 5

3-2. SUBPART A: GENERAL

Applicability of 14 CFR - Part 5.1

- (a) A certificate holder under **part 119** of this chapter, also authorised to conduct operations in accordance with the requirements of **Part 121** of this chapter, **must** have had an SMS which meets the requirements of this part and which is acceptable to the Administrator - by **March 9, 2018**
- (b) A certificate holder **must** have submitted an implementation plan to the FAA Administrator for review no later than **September 9, 2015**. The implementation plan must have been approved by no later than **March 9, 2016**
- (c) The implementation plan **may** include any of the certificate holder's existing programs, policies or procedures that it intends to use to meet the requirements of this part, including components of any existing SMS

3-3. SUBPART B: SAFETY POLICY

e. Coordination of Emergency Response Planning

Coordination of Emergency Response Planning - 14 CFR Part 5.27

Where emergency response procedures are required, the certificate holder **must** develop (and the 'accountable executive' must approve) - as part of the safety policy - an **emergency response plan** which addresses at least the following:

- (a) Delegation of emergency authority throughout the certificate holder's organisation
- (b) Assignment of employee responsibilities during the emergency.....and
- (c) Coordination of the certificate holder's emergency response plans with the emergency response plans of other organisations it must interface with during the provision of its services





(5) Discussion

The emergency response plan should provide procedures for management decision making and action in an emergency. This should include a line of succession of management authority sufficient to respond to emergencies

Coordination of emergency response plans with the emergency response plans of other organisations might include first responders to accidents or incidents, airport authorities and hazardous materials (hazmat) authorities

The plan might also address how to return or transition to normal operations after the emergency condition subsides. Many organisations already have emergency response plans which may be used to fulfil this requirement

Comment by Author of this Information Article

This information article (the document you are reading now) may be used to assist in achievement of the above DOT / FAA **ERP related** requirements as associated with the introduction of SMS

This article is targeted (mandatory requirement) at the **smaller / simpler Part 121** air carrier and also (voluntary requirement) re 'appropriate' **Part 135** air carriers. For the purposes of this information article, it is up to the Part 135 operator to decide if the word 'appropriate' applies to its aircraft and / or type of operation

Whilst not mentioned in the DOT / FAA advisory circular above, **Part 125** air carriers can, where appropriate and desired, also (voluntarily) use e.g. information such as is provided in this information article, to produce and manage their own ERPs





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European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)

Selected Extracts from appropriate EASA Regulations

EASA - Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to **Part-ORO**

(ORO = Organisational Requirements in Operations)

Consolidated version including Amendment 2 - 23 August 2013

Subpart GEN - GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

Section (Roman2) II - **Management**

SECTION II - MANAGEMENT AMC1 **ORO**.GEN.200 (a) (1); (2); (3); (5) Management system **NON-COMPLEX OPERATORS** - GENERAL

[http://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/04%20Part-ORO%20\(AMC-GM\)_Amdt2-Supplementary%20document%20to%20ED%20Decision%202013-019-R.pdf](http://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/04%20Part-ORO%20(AMC-GM)_Amdt2-Supplementary%20document%20to%20ED%20Decision%202013-019-R.pdf)

- (a) Safety risk management may be performed using hazard checklists or similar risk management tools or processes, which are integrated into the activities of the operator
- (b) The operator should manage safety risks related to a change. The management of change should be a documented process to identify external and internal change that may have an adverse effect on safety. It should make use of the operator's existing hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation processes
- (c) The operator should identify a person who fulfils the role of safety manager and who is responsible for coordinating the safety management system. This person may be the accountable manager or a person with an operational role within the operator
- (d) Within the operator, responsibilities should be identified for hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation
- (e) The safety policy should include a commitment to improve towards the highest safety standards, comply with all applicable legal requirements, meet all applicable standards, consider best practices and provide appropriate resources
- (f) **The operator should, in cooperation with other stakeholders, develop, coordinate and maintain an emergency response plan (ERP) which ensures orderly and safe transition from normal to emergency operations and return to normal operations. The ERP should provide the actions to be taken by the operator or specified individuals in an emergency and reflect the size, nature and complexity of the activities performed by the operator**





AMC1 **ORO**.GEN.200 (a) (3) Management System

COMPLEX OPERATORS - SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT

g) **The emergency response plan (ERP)**

- (1) An ERP should be established that provides the actions to be taken by the organisation or specified individuals in an emergency. The ERP should reflect the size, nature and complexity of the activities performed by the organisation
- (2) The ERP should ensure:
 - i. an orderly and safe transition from normal to emergency operations
 - ii. safe continuation of operations or return to normal operations as soon as practicable
 - iii. coordination with the emergency response plans of other organisations, where appropriate

AMC1 **ORO**.GEN.200 (a) (5) Management system

COMPLEX ORGANISATIONS - ORGANISATION'S SAFETY MANAGEMENT MANUAL

- (a) The safety management manual (SMM) should be the key instrument for communicating the approach to safety for the whole of the organisation. The SMM should document all aspects of safety management, including the safety policy, objectives, procedures and individual safety responsibilities
- (b) The contents of the safety management manual should include all of the following:
 - (1) scope of the safety management system
 - (2) safety policy and objectives
 - (3) safety accountability of the accountable manager
 - (4) safety responsibilities of key safety personnel
 - (5) documentation control procedures
 - (6) hazard identification and risk management schemes
 - (7) safety action planning
 - (8) safety performance monitoring
 - (9) incident investigation and reporting
 - (10) **emergency response planning**
 - (11) management of change (including organisational changes with regard to safety responsibilities)
 - (12) safety promotion





Note (from author / owner of the info article which you are reading right now)

The information shown on this and the next 3 pages has been included so that the 'interested' reader can understand a little better how an EASA organisation (as referred to above) might be classified as 'COMPLEX' or 'NON-COMPLEX'

AMC1 ORO.GEN.200 (b) Management system

SIZE, NATURE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE ACTIVITY

- (a) An **organisation** should be considered as '**complex**' when it has a workforce of **more than 20** full time equivalents (FTEs) involved in the activity (which is) subject to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules
- (b) Organisations with **up to 20** full time equivalents (FTEs) involved in the activity subject to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules, **may also be considered complex** based on an assessment of the following factors:
 - (1) in terms of complexity, the extent and scope of contracted activities subject to the approval
 - (2) in terms of risk criteria, whether any of the following are present:
 - (i) operations requiring the following specific approvals: performance-based navigation (PBN), low visibility operation (LVO), extended range operations with two engine aeroplanes (ETOPS), helicopter hoist operation (HHO), helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS), night vision imaging system (NVIS) and dangerous goods (DG)
 - (ii) different types of aircraft used
 - (iii) the environment (offshore, mountainous area - and similar)
- (c) Regardless of the criteria mentioned in (a) and (b) above, the following organisations **should always be considered as non-complex**:
 - Approved Training Organisations (ATOs) only providing training for the light aircraft pilot licence (LAPL), private pilot licence (PPL), sailplane pilot licence (SPL) or balloon pilot licence (BPL) and the associated ratings and certificates
 - Aero-Medical Centres (AeMCs)






EASA - Operations in General Aviation

<http://easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/general-aviation/operations-general-aviation>

Operator classification

When developing the European AIR OPS rules, EASA applied the **air operation** classification shown below. This classification was used to develop a different set of technical rules (e.g. for CAT, NCC, NCO, SPO operations) taking into account the principle of proportionality and the need for different safety levels. The safety levels were based on a risk hierarchy ranging from operations with a fare-paying CAT passenger which require the highest safety level to non-commercial single-pilot operations with non-complex aircraft (NCO) - which require a proportionately lower safety level



Applicable OPS rules for NCO and NCC operators

The Air Operations Regulation consists of 8 Annexes. The above chart summarises which Annexes are applicable to NCO and NCC operators

The term NCC stands for **non-commercial** operations with **complex** motor-powered aircraft

The term NCO stands for **non-commercial** operations with **other-than-complex** aircraft





The Working Method used to develop the (✳️ Air Ops Regulation) Non-Commercial Rules

✳️ EASA Air Operations Regulation [EU] No 965/2012 Part-NCC

The rules applicable to NCO and NCC operators were developed together with two different rulemaking groups. These rulemaking groups consisted of all relevant stakeholders, in particular representatives from general aviation associations such as EAS, AAOPA, EBAA, NBAA and IBAC; furthermore, representatives from manufacturers, staff associations, national aviation authorities and EASA experts. The rulemaking groups reached decisions by consensus of all members

The rulemaking groups took into account the comments and reactions received from stakeholders during the two public consultation procedures (NPA consultation and CRD consultation).

The development of non-commercial rules was based on the following objectives:

- to maintain a proportionate level of safety depending on the complexity of the aircraft
- to ensure proportionate rules between NCO and NCC operations
- to guarantee sufficient flexibility and efficiency for operators and authorities
- to be compliant with ICAO standards and recommended practices (SARPs) of Annex 6 Part II and Part III Sections III as far as feasible - and
- to be consistent with the rules of other Annexes under the AIR OPS Regulation

Difference between NCO and NCC

To provide proportionate rules, the Agency proposed two different sets of rules for **non-commercial** operations - depending on the complexity of the aircraft operated

For the operation of **non-complex** aircraft (aeroplanes, helicopters, sailplanes, balloons) proportionate basic safety rules apply (**Part-NCO**)

For the operation of **complex** aircraft (aeroplanes, helicopters) more advanced safety rules apply (**Part-NCC and selected elements of Part-ORO**), particularly taking into account that complex aircraft may carry a larger number of passengers and usually require professional teams for their operations

The term '**complex** motor-powered aircraft' is defined in the Basic (EASA) Regulation (EC No 216/2008) as follows:


'Complex motor-powered aircraft' shall mean:


(i) An aeroplane:

- with a maximum certificated take-off mass (MCTOM) exceeding 5,700 kg.....or
- certificated for a maximum passenger seating configuration of more than nineteen.....or





- certificated for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots.....or
- equipped with (a) turbojet engine(s) or  *more than one turboprop* engine..... or

 The European Commission has agreed a derogation which allows non-commercial operations of twin turboprop aeroplanes, with a MCTOM of 5700kg and below, to be operated under Part-NCO (Non-Commercial Operations) rules instead of Part-NCC. This also means that operators of this type of aircraft do not have to comply with Part-ORO (Organisation Requirements)

(ii) A helicopter certificated:

- for a maximum take-off mass exceeding 3,175 kg, or
- for a maximum passenger seating configuration of more than nine, or
- for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots, or

(iii) A tilt rotor aircraft

Note that in contrast to the associated (EASA) Basic Regulation definition..... ICAO defines a large aeroplane (in its Annex 6 Part II) as“An aeroplane of a maximum certificated take-off mass of over 5,700 kg”

The definition of a complex motor-powered aeroplane as defined in the (EASA) Basic Regulation deviates from the ICAO definition of a large aeroplane insofar as an (EASA defined) complex motor-powered aeroplane includes expressly a multi-engine turboprop aeroplane with a maximum take-off mass at or below 5,700 kg. Under the ICAO definition, such an aeroplane is classified as a small aeroplane

As stipulated in the Essential Requirements for Air Operations (Annex IV of the Basic Regulation), for such aeroplanes *the European rules are intentionally stricter than ICAO SARPs. For such aircraft, the NCC rules apply*

Comment by Author of this Information Article

This information article (the document you are reading now) may be used to assist in achievement of the above EASA **ERP related** requirements as they might relate to NCC and appropriate NCO type operations





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A De-identified (but real) Cargo Airline (known herein as 'ABCX Cargo')

'ABCX Cargo' airline conducts international, commercial cargo operations world-wide, using a small fleet (less than 10 aircraft) of cargo specific aircraft. Within this fleet are some of the largest aircraft (physical dimensions and mass / weight) ever made

This airline regularly carries dangerous goods

* The consequences of such an aircraft crashing into a densely populated urban area will obviously be 'catastrophic'

* If the reader requires more 'context' on large cargo aircraft crashing into populated areas - the information at the end of the following links should provide same:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Al_Flight_1862

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UPS_Airlines_Flight_6

Whilst this cargo operator is subject to the SMS requirements of its national regulating (civil aviation) authority, including those related to emergency planning and response, its resources (specifically, its *manpower* resources) are **absolutely insufficient** to permit its emergency response planning requirements to be adequately addressed, using the 'big boys' guidelines / templates referred to at the top of page 8 of this information article

Comment by Author of this Information Article

This information article (the document you are reading now) may be used to assist in achievement of **ERP related** requirements, as they might relate to **any** type of aircraft operation - where the consequences of an accident might realistically fall under the term '**catastrophic**' - and where the operator has insufficient resources (particularly manpower resources) to **adequately** provide a 'fit for purpose' emergency response

Note that the example used above relates to a cargo operator. However, the principle applies equally to any type of operator (including passenger operators which might be deemed to be represented by the term 'big boys' - as referred to further above) - where the lack of sufficient resources (again, particularly manpower resources) might realistically be deemed as being 'problematic'





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Appendix B

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